How to Review Style-Based Stock Portfolio Performance Evaluations

Stock or Manager Relevance Comparisons and Philosophy

By Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA, CMP™

[Publisher-in-Chief]

One relatively recent performance evaluation approach that was developed to help improve the relevance of comparisons is the separation of stock universes and managers by style. This classification method attempts to distinguish between stocks or manager philosophies based upon general financial characteristics of the investments.

The Managers

In very general terms, a manager is often a growth manager if the investment approach that the manager uses focuses on stocks showing growth and momentum in its earnings and price.

A value manager is generally considered to be a manager that attempts to identify under-valued securities based upon fundamental analysis of the company.  A stock may be considered either “growth” or “value” based on a given set of valuation measures such as price-to-earnings, price-to-book value, and dividend yield.

The Style

The goal of style-based performance comparisons is to take some of the biases of the market environment out of the comparison, since a portfolio’s returns will ideally be evaluated versus a universe of alternatives that represent similar investment characteristics facing the same basic market environment.  Thus, if the environment is one in which investors in stocks with strong past earnings and price momentum have generally performed better than those using fundamental analysis to find under-valued stocks, comparing the growth/momentum portfolio to a growth index or universe should help eliminate the bias.

Style-based universes can help the medical professional better understand the basic environment captured over a given performance time period.

However, there are significant limitations with the various approaches to constructing style-based stock and manager universes that should be understood if they are to be used in direct performance comparisons.  Taking style-based stock universes separately from style-based manager universe, one of the most significant issues regarding the categorization of stocks by “growth” and “value” styles is the lack of agreement in the specification of what a growth stock is versus a value stock.  With some universes divided by price-to-book value, others by price-to-earnings and/or dividend yields and some by combinations of similar variables, stocks are often classified very differently by two different stock universes.  Further, stocks move across a broad spectrum as their price and fundamentals change, resulting in stocks constantly moving between growth and value categories for any given universe.  If there is ambiguity in the rating of a given stock, then the difficulty is only compounded when we attempt to boil what may be complex investment processes of an investment manager or mutual fund portfolio manager to a simple classification of growth or value.  A beaten down cyclical stock that no self-respecting growth/momentum manager would purchase may be classified as “growth” because it has a high price-to-earnings ratio (i.e., from low earnings) or a high price-to-book value (i.e., from asset write-offs).  Value managers are not the only ones to own low valuation stocks that have improving earnings.

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The second problem with style categorization is that managers are often misclassified or they purposefully “game” the categorization of their own process in order to appear more competitive.  As an example, if a manager that typically looks for relatively strong earnings/price momentum is lagging in a period when “growth” managers are outperforming, the rank of the manager can be improved simply by claiming a “value” approach.  Morningstar’s “style box” classification of mutual funds by size and style of the current portfolio highlight this problem for any given fund by showing how their portfolio has changed its classification annually.

Current Events

The stock market has been booming lately. Up almost 100% since March 2009, after being down almost 50%. And so, perhaps this is a good time to re-evaluate the performance of your investment portfolio[s].

Assessment

However, this leads to an interesting question for the medical professional or his/her advisor: If a manager is still using the same basic investment philosophy and disciplines, but their “style” category has changed according to the ratings service, should you fire them?  If the answer is “yes”, then the burden of monitoring and the cost of manager turnover are an inevitable part of narrow style based performance comparisons.

But, if the answer is “no,” then it is easy to see the difficulty of fitting every management approach into a simple style box.  The more reasonable alternative is to use style-based stock and manager universes as a tool for understanding the environment, rather than an absolute performance benchmark.

Conclusion

And so, your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

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What is the Current Rate of Return [CRR] for [Pandemic] Investments?

THE INVESTING “CURRENT RATE OF RETURN

By Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA CMP®

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Stock Market Pandemic History

Technology stocks have largely been in favor since the COVID-19 pandemic began, but re-openings in the U.S. and elsewhere as vaccines take hold have pushed investors toward value stocks, which are geared more toward the economy. But lately, stronger growth expectations are also sparking worries of higher inflation, and a potential tapping of the brakes by central banks.

Therefore, an important concept for physicians and all investors to understand is the Current Rate of Return (CCR).

So, What Exactly is CRR?

According to this principle, the current rate of a taxable return must be evaluated in reference to a similar non-taxable rate of return. This allows you to focus on your portfolio’s real (after-tax return), rather than its’ nominal, or stated return. Since most medical professionals own a combination of both vehicles, it is important to calculate the average rate of return (ARR), as demonstrated in the following matrix. Usually, this will result in the assumption of more risk, for the possibility of great return.

To compare after tax yields, with taxable yields, use the following formulas:

Tax equivalent yield = yield / (1 – MTB), while taxable yield X (1-tax rate) = tax exempt yield.

Example: if the yield on a tax exempt municipal bond was 6%, and you are in a 28% tax bracket; the equivalent taxable yield (ETY), is 8.3%, calculated in the following manner: 06 / 1.00 – .28 =.083, or, 8.3% ETY.

This means that you would need a taxable instrument paying almost 9 % to equal the 6 percent tax exempt bond.   

ASSESSMENT: Your thoughts are appreciated.    

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VALUE STOCKS: Now Seeking Bargains?

Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA CMP

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The bargain-hunting value style is looking for shares that are under priced in relation to the company’s future potential. A value investor will invest in a company in the expectation that its shares will increase in value over time. Value investing is based essentially on quantitative criteria; asset values, cash flow, and discounted future earnings. The key properties of value shares are low Price/Earnings, Price/Sales ratios, and normally higher dividend yields. 

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No Christmas Rally this year!

So, on observing a company’s earnings growth, a value manager will decide whether to buy shares based on the company’s consistency or recovery prospects. The key research questions are: 1) Does the current P/E ratio warrant an investment in a slow growth company or, 2) Is the company a higher growth candidate that has dropped in price due to a temporary problem.  If this is the case, will the company’s earnings growth recover, and if so, when? The key to value investing is to find bargain shares (priced low historically or for temporary and/or irrational reasons), avoiding shares that are merely cheap (priced low because the company is failing).

The buying opportunity is identified when a company undergoing some immediate problems is perceived to have good chances of recovery in the medium to long term.  If there is a loss in market confidence in the company, the share price may fall, and the value investor can step in. Once the share price has achieved a suitable value, reflecting the predicted turnaround in company performance, the shareholding is sold, realizing a capital gain. A potential risk in value investing is that the company may not turn around, in which case the share price may stay static or fall.

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PODCAST: Value Investing with Vitaliy Katsenelson CFA

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Amazon.com: Vitaliy Katsenelson: Books, Biography, Blog, Audiobooks, Kindle

By Vitaliy N. Katsenelson, CFA

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EDITOR’S NOTE: In this interview with investment website @GuruFocus, my colleague Vitaliy shares the full gamut of how he invests, where and why. He touches on the role of being eclectic when investing, how to invest abroad, and how value investors should think about macro-economics and finance, among many other important topics. Enjoy this fun and wide-ranging interview! It is very timely with the S&P 500, DJIA and NASDAQ just posting their 4th straight day of gains while Facebook rattled investors by posting a rare profit decline, driven by the company’s heavy spending on its vision for a so-called Metaverse and simultaneously confronting advertising challenges on its existing services.

Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA CMP®

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PODCAST: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTSTbF0GwVw&t=69s

VALUE STOCKS: https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/value-stocks-just-had-their-best-month-since-the-peak-of-the-2001-dot-com-bubble-%e2%80%94-and-theres-still-more-upside-to-come-bank-of-america-says/ar-AATpt1m?li=BBnb7Kz

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COVID, Inflation and Value Investing

Millennial Investing

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By Vitaliy Katsenelson, CFA

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COVID, Inflation, and Value Investing: Millennial Investing
I was recently interviewed by Millennial Investors podcast. They sent me questions ahead of time that they wanted to ask me “on the air”. I found some of the questions very interesting and wanted to explore deeper. Thus, I ended up writing answers to them (I think through writing). You can listen to the podcast here

By the way, I often get asked how I find time to write. Do I even do investment research? Considering how much content I’ve been spewing out lately, I can understand these questions. In short – I write two hours a day, early in the morning (usually from 5–7am), every single day. I don’t have time-draining hobbies like golf. I rarely watch sports. I have a great team at IMA, and I delegate a lot. I spend the bulk of my day on research because I love doing it. 

This is not the first time I was asked these questions. If you’d like to adapt some of my daily hacks in your life, read this essay.

How has Covid-19 changed the game of value investing?

Value investing has not changed. Its fundamental principles, which I describe in “The Six Commandments of Value Investing,” (one-click sign up here to receive it in your inbox) have not changed one iota. The principles are alive and well. What has changed is the environment – the economy. 

I learned this from my father and Stoic philosophers: You want to break up complex problems into smaller parts and study each part individually. That way you can engage in more-nuanced thinking. 

Let’s start with what has not changed. Our desire for in-person human interaction has not changed. At the beginning of the pandemic, we (including yours truly) were concerned about that. We were questioning whether we were going to ever be able to shake hands and hug again. However, the pandemic has not changed millions of years of human evolution – we still crave human warmth and personal interaction. We need to keep this in mind as we think about the post-pandemic world. 

What we learned in 2021 is that coronavirus mutations make predicting the end of the pandemic an impossible exercise. From today’s perch it is safe to assume that Covid-19 will become endemic, and we’ll learn how to live with it. I am optimistic on science. 

Let’s take travel, for example. Our leisure travel is not going to change much – we are explorers at heart, and as we discovered during the pandemic, we crave a change in scenery. However, I can see business travel resetting to a lower base post-pandemic, as some business trips get resolved by simple Zoom calls. Business travel is about 12% of total airline tickets, but those revenues come with much higher profit margins for airlines. 

Work from home. I am still struggling with this one. The norms of the 20th-century workplace have been shaken up by the pandemic. Add the availability of new digital tools and I don’t need to be a Nostradamus to see that the office environment will be different. 

By how much? 

The work from home genie is out of the bottle. It will be difficult to squeeze it back in. My theory right now is that customer support, on-the-phone types of jobs may disproportionately get decentralized. The whole idea of a call center is idiotic – you push a lot of people into a large warehouse-like office space, where they sit six feet apart from each other and spend eight hours a day on the phone talking to customers without really interacting with each other. Current technology allows all this work to be done remotely.

On another hand, I can see that if you have a company where creative ideas are sparked by people bumping into each other in hallways, then work from home is less ideal. But again, I don’t think about it in binary terms, but more like it’s a spectrum. Even for my company. Before the pandemic, half of our folks worked outside of the IMA main office in Denver. Most of our future hires will be local, as I believe it is important for our culture. However, we provide a certain number of days a year of remote work as a benefit to our in-office employees. 

From an investment perspective, we are making nuanced bets on global travel normalizing. We don’t own airlines – never liked those businesses, never will. Most of their profitability comes from travel miles – they became mostly flying banks. 

Office buildings I also put into a too-difficult-to-call pile. There was already plenty overcapacity in office real estate before the pandemic, and office buildings were priced for perfection. The pandemic did not make them more valuable. Maybe some of that overcapacity will get resolved through conversion of office buildings into apartments. By the way, this is the beauty of having a portfolio of 20–30 stocks: I don’t need to own anything I am not absolutely head over heels in love with.

What is the importance of developing a process to challenge your own beliefs?

My favorite quote from Seneca is “Time discovers truth.” My goal is to discover the truth before time does. I try to divorce our stock ownership from our feelings. 

Let me give you this example. If you watch chess grandmasters study their past games, they look for mistakes they have made, moves they should have made, so in the future they won’t make the same mistake twice. I have also noticed they say “white” and “black,” not “I” and “the opponent.” This little trick removes them from the game so that they can look for the best move for each side. They say “This is the best move for white”; “This is the best move for black.”

You hear over and over again from people like Warren Buffett and other value investors that we should buy great companies at reasonable prices, and I’d like to dig deeper on that idea and its two key parts, great companies and reasonable prices. Could you tell us what it takes for a company to qualify as a “great” company?

This question touches on Buffett’s transformation away from Ben Graham’s “statistical” approach, i.e., buying crappy companies that look numerically cheap at a significant discount to their fair value, to buying companies that have a significant competitive advantage, a high return on capital, and a growth runway for their earnings. 

The first type of companies often will not be high-quality businesses and will most likely not be growing earnings much. Let’s say the company is earning $1. Its earnings power will not change much in the future – it is a $5 stock trading at 5 times earnings. If its fair value is $10, trading at 10 times earnings, And if this reversion to fair value happens in one year, you’ll make 100%. If it takes 5 years then your return will be 20% a year (I am ignoring compounding here). So time is not on your side. If it takes 10 years to close the fair value gap, your return halves. Therefore you need a bigger discount to compensate for that. Maybe, instead of buying that stock at a 50% discount, you need to buy a company that is not growing at a 70% discount, at $3 instead of $5. This was pre-Charlie Munger, “Ben Graham Buffett.” 

Then Charlie showed him there was value in growth. If you find a company that has a moat around its business, has a high return on capital, and can grow earnings for a long time, its statistical value may not stare you in the face. But time is on your side, and there is a lot of value in this growth. If a company earns $1 today and you are highly confident it will earn $2 in five years, then over five years, if it trades at 10 times earnings, a no-growth company may be a superior investment if the valuation gap closes in less than 5 years, while one with growing earnings is a superior investment past year 5. 

Both stocks fall into the value investing framework of buying businesses at a discount to their fair value, looking for a margin of safety. With the second one, though, you have to look into the future and discount it back. With the first one, because the lack of growth in the future is not much different from the present, you don’t have to look far.

There is a place for both types of stocks in the portfolio – there are quality companies that can still grow and there are companies whose growth days are behind them. In our process we equalize them by always looking four to five years out. 

What qualifies as a “reasonable price”? 

We are looking for a discount to fair value where fair value always lies four to five years out. In our discounted cash flow models, we look a decade out. Our required rate of return and discount to fair value will vary by a company’s quality. There are more things that can go wrong with lower-quality companies than with the better ones. High-quality companies are more future-proof and thus require lower discount rates. We are incredibly process-driven. We have a matrix by which we rate all companies on their quality and guestimate their fair value five years out, and this is how we arrive at the price we want to pay today. 

Why do you believe that buying great companies sometimes isn’t a great investing strategy?

Because that is first-level thinking, which only looks at what stares you in the face – things that are obvious even to untrained eyes and thus to everyone. First-level thinking ignores second-order effects. If everyone knows a company is great, then its stock price gets bid up and the great company stops being a great investment. With second-level thinking you need to ask an additional question, which in this case is, what is the expected return? Being a great company is not enough; it has to be undervalued to be a good stock. 

We are looking for great companies that are temporarily (key word) misunderstood and thus the market has fallen out of love with them. Over the last decade, when interest rates only declined, first-level thinking was rewarded. It almost did not matter how much you paid for a stock. If it was a great company, its valuations got more and more inflated. 

You’re a big advocate of having a balanced investment approach that is able to weather all storms. What investments have you found that you expect will be able to hold their buying power if inflation persists through 2022 and 2023?


There are many different ways to answer this question. In fact, every time I give an answer to this question I arrive at a new answer. You want to own companies that have fixed costs. You want assets that have a very long life. I am thinking about pipeline companies, for instance. They require little upkeep expense, and their contracts allow for CPI increases (no decreases); thus higher inflation will add to their revenue while their costs will mostly remain the same. 

We own tobacco companies, too. I lived in Russia in the early ’90s when inflation was raging. I smoked. I was young and had little money. I remember one day I discovered that cigarette prices had doubled. I had sticker shock for about a day. I gave up going to movies but somehow scraped up the money for cigarettes. 

Whatever answer I give you here will be incomplete. It’s a complex problem, and so each stock requires individual analysis. In all honesty, you have to approach it on a case-by-case basis. 

With higher inflation, you’d expect bond yields to rise, since bond investors will demand a higher return to keep pace with inflation. However, CPI inflation is currently over 6%, and the 10-year Treasury is sitting at 1.5%. Why haven’t we seen Treasury yields rise more, and what does it mean for investors if a spread this wide persists?

I am guessing here. My best guess is that so far investors have bought into the Fed’s rhetoric that inflation is transitory due to the economy’s rough reopening and supply chain problems. I wrote a long article on this topic. To sum up, part of the inflation is transitory but not all of it. 

I am somewhat puzzled by the labor market today. I’ve read a few dozen very logical explanations for the labor shortage, from early retirement of baby boomers to the pandemic triggering a search for the meaning of life and thus people quitting dead jobs and all becoming Uber drivers or starting their own businesses. Labor is the largest expense on the corporate income statement, and if it continues to be scarce then inflation will persist. 

I read that employees are now demanding to work from home because they don’t want to commute. The labor shortages are shifting the balance of power to employees for the first time in decades. This will backfire in the long run, as employers will be looking at how to replace employees with capital, in other words, with automation. If you run a fast-food restaurant and your labor costs are up 20–30% or you simply cannot hire anyone, you’ll be looking for a burger flipping machine. 

If we continue to run enormous fiscal deficits, then the US dollar will crack. The pandemic has accelerated a lot of trends that were in place. We were on our way to losing our reserve currency status. Let me clarify: That is going to be a very slow, very incremental process. It will be slow because currency pricing is not an absolute but a relative endeavor, and the alternatives out there are not great. But two decades ago the US dollar was a no-brainer decision and today it is not. So we’ll see countries slowly diversifying away from it. A weaker US dollar means higher, non transitory inflation. 

You wrote The Little Book of Sideways Markets, in which you point out that history shows that a sideways market typically occurs after a secular bull market. With the role that the Federal Reserve plays in the financial markets, do you still anticipate that valuations will normalize in the coming years?

I say yes, in part because declining interest rates have pushed all assets into stratospheric valuations. Rising bond yields and valuations pushed heavenward are incompatible. Yes, I expect valuations to do what they’ve done every time in history: to mean revert. In big part this will depend on interest rates, but if rates stay low because the economy stutters, then valuations will decline – this is what happened in Japan following their early-1990s bubble. Interest rates went to zero or negative, but valuations declined. 

The stock market today is very much driven by the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. Is there a point at which they are able to take the gas off the pedal and allow markets to normalize?

I am really puzzled by this. We simply cannot afford higher interest rates. Going into the pandemic our debt-to-GDP was increasing steadily despite the growing economy. In fact, you could argue that most of our growth has come from the accumulation of debt (the wonders of being the world’s reserve currency). Our debt has roughly equaled our GDP, and all of our economic growth in some years equaled the growth in government debt.

During the pandemic we added 40% to our debt in less than two years. We have higher debt-to-GDP than we had during WWII. After the war we reduced our debt. Also, we were a different economy then – we were rebuilding both the US and Europe. As a society we had a high tolerance for pain. 

Just like debt increases stimulate growth, deleveraging reduces growth. Also, I don’t think politicians or the public care about high debt levels. So far debt has only brought prosperity. However, higher interest rates would blow a huge hole in government budgets. If the 10-year Treasury rises a few percentage points, interest rates will increase by the amount we spend on national defense. One thing I am certain about is that our defense spending will not decline, so higher interest rates will lead to money printing and thus inflation. 

I am also puzzled by the impact of higher interest rates on the housing market. Housing will simply become unaffordable if interest rates go up a few percentage points. Loan-to-income requirements will price a huge number of people out of the market, and housing prices will have to decline. This Higher rates will also reduce the number of transactions in the real estate market, because people will be locked into their 2.5% mortgages, and if they sell they’d have to get 4-5-6% mortgages. There are a lot of second-order effects that we are not seeing today that will be obvious in hindsight. Housing prices drive demand in adjacent sectors such as home improvement. And think of the impact of higher rates on any large purchase, for example a car. 

We’re seeing the continuing rise of China has a big player in the global economy, and I know you like to invest internationally. As a value investor, how do you think about China’s rise as a global powerhouse and how it might affect the financial markets?

During the Cold War there were two gravitational centers, and as a country you had to choose one – you were either with the Soviets or with the West. Something similar will likely transpire here, too. I have to be careful using the Cold War analogy, because the Cold War was driven by ideology – it was communism vs. capitalism. Now the tension is driven by economic competition and our unwillingness to pass the mantle of global leader to another country. 

We are drawing red lines in technology. Data is becoming the new oil. China is using data to control people, and we want to make sure they don’t have control over our data. Therefore, the West wants to make sure that our technology is China-free. The US, Europe, and India will likely be pursuing a path where Chinese technology and Chinese intellectual property are largely disallowed. We have already seen this happening with Huawei being banned from the US and Western Europe. Other countries, including Russia, will have to make a choice. Russia will go with China.

Also, we are concerned that most chip production is centered in Taiwan, which at some point may be grabbed by China. The technological ecosystem would then have to undergo a significant transformation. This has already started to happen as we begin to bring chip production back to the US and Europe. 

The pandemic made us realize that globalization had made us reliant on the kindness of strangers, and we found we could not even get facemasks or ventilators. 

Globalization was deflationary; deglobalization will be inflationary.

This increased tension between countries has led to your investing in the defense industry. Could you tell us how you think about this industry? 

Despite the rise of international tensions, the global defense industry has been one of sectors that still had reasonable (sometimes unreasonably good) valuations. We have invested in half a dozen US and European defense companies. The US defense budget is unlikely to decline in the near future. There is a common misperception that Republicans love defense and Democrats hate it. Those may be party taglines, but history shows that defense spending has been driven by macro factors – it did not matter who was the occupant of the White House. 

There are a lot of things to like about defense businesses. They are an extension of the US or European governments. Most of them are friendly monopolies or duopolies. They have strong balance sheets, good returns on capital, and predictable and growing (maybe even accelerating) demand. They are noncyclical. They have inflation escalators built into their contracts. I don’t have to worry about technological disruptions. They are also a good macro hedge.

We added to our European defense stocks recently for several reasons. Europe has underinvested in defense, relying on the US Yet we have shown time and again that we may not be as dependable as we once were. 

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COVID, Inflation and Value Investing [Millennial Interview]

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By Vitaliy Katsenelson CFA

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COVID, Inflation, and Value Investing: Millennial Investing Interview
I was recently interviewed by Millennial Investors podcast. They sent me questions ahead of time that they wanted to ask me “on the air”. I found some of the questions very interesting and wanted to explore deeper. Thus, I ended up writing answers to them (I think through writing). You can listen to the podcast here

By the way, I often get asked how I find time to write. Do I even do investment research? Considering how much content I’ve been spewing out lately, I can understand these questions. In short – I write two hours a day, early in the morning (usually from 5–7am), every single day. I don’t have time-draining hobbies like golf. I rarely watch sports. I have a great team at IMA, and I delegate a lot. I spend the bulk of my day on research because I love doing it. 

This is not the first time I was asked these questions. If you’d like to adapt some of my daily hacks in your life, read this essay.

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CONCLUSION: The Six Commandments of Value Investing

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Investing and Chess

By Vitaliy Katsenelson, CFA

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Conclusion: Investing and Chess 

I read somewhere that chess is a game of small advantages. When the game starts, the players are equal – both hold the same number of pieces in the same positions. But then every move either adds to your position (competitive advantage) or subtracts from it. These little decisions (resulting in a better pawn structure, a more secure king, a centrally positioned knight, and so on) that you make with every move accumulate into victory. 

Investing is not that much different, especially in today’s world where access to information has flattened. A mutual fund that manages $100 billion may spend $100 million on research, but that $100 million doesn’t buy any more than what a patient value investor can glean by reading financial statements. 

I am not talking about Warren Buffett either, who doesn’t even have a PC in his office. Ted Weschler and Todd Combs (Warren Buffett’s right-hand men) achieved phenomenal investment success without a fancy research department by simply reading carefully and following our Six Commandments. 

The key to succeeding in this irrational world is to actively ingrain each one of these principles into your investment operating system, improving your process just a little on a daily basis, and then success will follow. 

Finally, this would not be a worthy chapter if I did not contradict myself, just a little. Investing is also unlike chess. Investing affords us a luxury that few people appreciate: You can choose your own opponent. In chess tournaments, you don’t get to choose your opponent. Tournament organizers match you to someone with an equal rating; then as you win, you are progressively matched against better opponents. 

In investing, you are the “tournament organizer.” You get to walk into the room and, instead of choosing the geekiest opponent – the dude with thick glasses who hasn’t been on a date in years and has only thought and dreamt about chess – you can go for the muscular guy who spends five hours a day in the gym, and only joined the tournament because he lost a bet. 

Money doesn’t know how you made it. A hundred dollars made by solving easy problems (buying stocks where both your IQ and EQ were at their highest) buys as much as a hundred dollars that caused you to lose your hair. In investing, you don’t have to solve the problems that everyone else is solving. There are thousands of stocks out there, and your portfolio needs only a few dozen.

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#6: The Six Commandments of Value Investing

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6. In the long run, stocks revert to their fair value

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EDITOR’S NOTE: Although it has been some time since speaking live with busy colleague Vitaliy Katsenelson CFA, I review his internet material frequently and appreciate this ME-P series contribution. I encourage all ME-P readers to do the same and consider his value investing insights carefully.

By Vitaliy Katsenelson, CFA

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6. In the long run, stocks revert to their fair value

Reversion to fair value is not a pie-in-the-sky concept. If a stock is significantly undervalued for a long time, then this undervaluation gets cured, eventually. That can happen through share buybacks – the company can basically buy all of its shares and take itself private.

Or it can happen by the company’s paying out its earnings in dividends, thus creating yields that the market will not be able to ignore. Or the company’s competitors will realize that it is cheaper for them to buy the company than to replicate its assets on their own. Either way, undervaluation gets cured.

This faith that undervaluation will not last forever is paramount to value investing. But this is not your regular faith, which requires belief without proof. This is evidence-supported faith with hundreds of years of data to back it. Just look at the US stock market: it has gone through cycles when it was incredibly cheap and others when it was incredibly expensive. At some points in its journey from one extreme to the other, it touched its fair value, even if it was transitory.

Historically, value investing (owning undervalued companies) has done significantly better than other strategies. Paradoxically, the reason it has done well in the long run is because it did not work consistently in the short run. If something works consistently (keyword), everybody piles into it and it stops working.

These aforementioned cycles of temporary brilliance and dumbness are not just common to us mere mortals. Even Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway goes through them. As just one example, in 1999, when the stock market went up 21%, Berkshire Hathaway stock declined 19%. In 1999, the financial press was writing obituaries for Buffett’s investment prowess.

Suddenly, in 1999, Buffett’s IQ was lagging the market by 40%. At the time, investors were infatuated with internet stocks that were not making money but that were supposed to have a bright future. Investors were selling unsexy “old economy” stocks that Buffett owned in order to buy the “new economy” ones.

If at the end of 1999, you were to sell Berkshire Hathaway and buy the S&P 500 instead, you would have done the easy thing, but it would have been a large (though very common) mistake. Over the next three years Berkshire Hathaway gained over 30% while the S&P declined over 40%. During the year 1999, Buffett’s IQ did not change much; in fact, the (book) value of businesses Berkshire Hathaway owned went up by 0.5% that year. But in 1999, the market’s attention was somewhere else and it chose to price Berkshire Hathaway 19% lower. 

As a value investor, if you do a reasonable job estimating what the business is worth, then at some point the stock market will price it accordingly. You need to have faith. I am acutely aware how wishful this statement sounds. But this faith, the belief in mean reversion, has to be deeply ingrained in our psyche. It will allow us to remain rational when people around us are not. 

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CITE: https://www.r2library.com/Resource/Title/0826102549

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Editor’s Final Note; Many thanks to VK for this timely series on value investing. Our ME-P readers appreciate you.

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#5: The Six Commandments of Value Investing

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EDITOR’S NOTE: Although it has been some time since speaking live with busy colleague Vitaliy Katsenelson CFA, I review his internet material frequently and appreciate this ME-P series contribution. I encourage all ME-P readers to do the same and consider his value investing insights carefully.

By Vitaliy Katsenelson, CFA

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5. Risk is a permanent loss of capital (not volatility)

Conventional wisdom views volatility as risk. Not value investors. We befriend volatility, embrace it, and try to take advantage of it. For someone who has not researched a company, it is not readily apparent whether a decline in shares is temporary or permanent. After all, if you don’t know what the company is worth, the quoted price becomes the quotient of intrinsic value. If you do know what the company is worth, then the change in intrinsic value is all that is going to matter. The price quoted on the exchange will be your friend, allowing you to take advantage of the difference between intrinsic value and quoted stock price. If the quoted stock price is significantly cheaper than your estimated intrinsic value, you buy it (or buy more of it if you already own it). If the opposite is true, you sell it.

What is a company worth?

Determining the intrinsic value requires a combination of art and science, in that order – it is not quoted on the exchanges. We go about this the same way a businessman would figure how much he’d want to pay for a gas station or a McDonald’s franchise. Analysis of each company will be different, but at the core we estimate the cash flows the business will produce for shareholders in the long run (at least ten years) and what the business will be worth then (based on our estimate of its earnings power at the time). The combination of the two provides us an approximation of what the business is worth now. To further embed “the right” type of risk analysis into our investment operating system, we build financial models. Models help us to understand businesses better and provide insights as to which metrics matter and which don’t. They allow us to stress test the business: We don’t just look at the upside but spend a lot of times looking at the downside – we try to “kill” the business. We look at known risks and try to imagine unknown ones; we try to quantify their impact on cash flows. This “killing” helps to us understand how much of a discount (margin of safety) we should demand to what the business is worth. By applying this discount to fair value, we arrive at a buy price. For every stock we buy we probably look at a few dozen (at least).

For instance, if we are looking at a company that is selling products or services to consumers, we’ll be focusing on customer-acquisition costs. We try to drill down to the essential operating metrics of each company. If it’s a convenience store retailer, we’ll look into gallons of gas sold and profit per gallon. If it’s an oil driller, we’ll look at utilization rates, rigs in service, average revenue per rig per day. If it’s a pharmaceuticals company, we’ll have revenue lines for each major drug it sells and model the company for the eventuality that patents will run out. (Revenues usually decline 80-90% when a patent expires).

These models help us to understand the economics of the business. We usually build two type of models. We start with what we call the “tablecloth” model. This is a very detailed, in-depth model that zeros in on different aspects of the business. But the risk we run with a tablecloth model is that we get lost in the trees and forget about the forest.

This brings us to our “napkin” model. It’s a much simpler and smaller model that focuses only on the essentials of the business. It is easier to build the tablecloth model than the “napkin.” If we can build a napkin model, that means we understand the drivers of the business – we understand what matters. Models are important because they help us remain rational. It is only the matter of time before a stock we own will “blow up” (or, in layman’s terms, decline).

In this type of analysis, what happens this month, this quarter, or even this year is only important in the context of the long run – unless the company’s good or bad earnings report in any quarter changes our assumptions on the company’s long-term cash flows. If you methodically focus on what the company is worth and if your Total IQ is maximized, then price fluctuations are just noise. Volatility becomes your friend because you can rationally take advantage of it. It’s an under-appreciated gift from Mr. Market.

Side Note: As an advisor, I feel it is one of my great responsibilities to be an honest and clear communicator. There is an asymmetry of information between us and our clients. We have invested weeks and months of research into the analysis of each stock; therefore, we have a good idea what each company is worth. Our clients have not done this research, and they should not have to – that is what they hired us to do.This is why we pour our heart and soul into our quarterly letters – we want to close this informational gap and so we try as hard as we can to explain what we think the companies in our portfolio are worth. Our letters are often 15-20 pages long. 

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#4: The Six Commandments of Value Investing

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EDITOR’S NOTE: Although it has been some time since speaking live with busy colleague Vitaliy Katsenelson CFA, I review his internet material frequently and appreciate this ME-P series contribution. I encourage all ME-P readers to do the same and consider his value investing insights carefully.

By Vitaliy Katsenelson, CFA

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4. Margin of safety – leave room in your buy price for being wrong

Margin of safety is a function of two dimensions: a company’s quality and its growth.

I am generalizing here, but exogenous events have a greater impact on a lower-quality business than a higher-quality one. Thus a high-quality company needs a lower margin of safety than a lower-quality one.

A company that is growing earnings and paying dividends has time on its side and thus may not need as much margin of safety as a lower-growing one.

We quantify both a company’s quality and growth, and thus margin of safety is deeply embedded in our investment operating system.

The larger discount to the stock’s fair value (the $1) the less clairvoyance you need to have about the future of the business. For instance, in 2013, when Apple stock was trading at $400 (pre-split) we didn’t have to have a very clear crystal ball about Apple’s future; Apple just had to be able to barely fog the mirror.

In later years, at $900, we need to have a lot more precision in our analysis of Apple’s future. 

CITE: https://www.r2library.com/Resource/Title/082610254

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#3: The Six Commandments of Value Investing (Part 2)

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EDITOR’S NOTE: Although it has been some time since speaking live with busy colleague Vitaliy Katsenelson CFA, I review his internet material frequently and appreciate this ME-P series contribution. I encourage all ME-P readers to do the same and consider his value investing insights carefully.

By Vitaliy Katsenelson, CFA

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3. The market is there to serve you, not the other way around (Part 2)

First, we increase it by subtraction, by shrinking our universe to stocks that lie within both our IQ and EQ comfort zones.

We are very careful about stocks or industries where either our IQ or EQ is questionable. For instance, we have recognized that our IQ is low when it comes to non-revenue-generating, single-future-product biotech companies. We have zero analytical insights into this business. None.

We find that our EQ is fairly low when it comes to complex financial businesses. We don’t invest in any.

The beauty of investing is that we only need 20-30 stocks, and we get to choose which problems we want to tackle. We usually like easy problems.

In other professions, that is a luxury you don’t have. If you are an orthopedic surgeon, you are not going to tell your patient that you only operate on right knees because the last time out you had a bad experience with a left knee.

Second, we look for areas where our EQ is highest.

Over the years, we’ve discovered that our EQ is much higher with higher-quality companies. Therefore, for every company in our portfolio or on our watch list, we quantify quality. And with very rare exceptions, we own only very-high-quality companies.

We quantify quality for another reason, too. As value investors, we are innately focused on a margin of safety. We found that if you don’t quantify quality, it is very easy to lower your standards when you reach for value, especially in a very expensive market.

We went a step further: Quality, for us, is a filter. If a company doesn’t pass its quality test, it is dead to us. It may have high growth prospects, pay high dividends, and it may sell at a mouthwatering valuation. But if it failed our quality test, it is still dead to us.

By quantifying quality, we can keep the overall quality of our portfolio very high. Just as importantly, we can keep our EQ high, too.

By maximizing both our IQ and EQ for individual stocks, we maximize the Total IQ of the portfolio. Thus, when we get punched in the mouth, we are able to rationally reanalyze a stock and may decide to buy more, do nothing, or sell.

We cautiously guard our EQ and long-term horizon. We don’t let the outside world come unchecked into our daily life. For instance, we spend little time watching business TV during the day, as we find it to be toxic to our time horizon and to our investor (as opposed to trader) mentality. For the same reason, we also don’t look at our portfolio more than twice a day.

Finally, and this applies to professional investors only, you need to have clients who will allow you to maintain your EQ. Following the Six Commandments is practically impossible if your clients don’t believe in them.

Here’s a real example:

On my recent purchase of Apple stock coming off a one year top and heading down.

On January 25th, 2013 at 3:55 pm I got this email from a client, David:

David and I talked on the phone, and I tried to explain our logic. I’m not going to bore you with that, but it was along the lines of “incredible brand, high recurrence of revenues, great management, a quarter of market capitalization in cash; we tried to kill it (we lowered its margins, cut sales) and we simply couldn’t.”

I told David that the price of the stock is an opinion of value, not a final verdict – he didn’t care. He’d talked to his neighbor who was a famous technician, who said, “Apple is going down.” To which my response was, “If it declines that will be a blessing – the company is buying back stock, and we are going to buy more.”

The “technician” was right: Apple declined from $455 ($65 split-adjusted), our initial purchase price, to $395 ($56 split-adjusted). We bought more Apple as it fell. This encounter also made me realize how this negative psychology around Apple was creating an opportunity in Apple, and I wrote a two-part article describing the aforementioned incident as evidence of that.

What I did not say in that article is that we had to amicably part ways with David. I tried very hard to communicate the Six Commandments to him, but he was not willing to (re)learn. Keeping him as a client would erode my overall EQ and would have impacted other clients.

Your mental state is as important as your ability to analyze a company’s balance sheet or your ability to value the business. You may spend days sharpening your investment process, your analytical skills; but in the end, if your EQ is low nothing else will matter.

CITE: https://www.r2library.com/Resource/Title/082610254

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#3: The Six Commandments of Value Investing (Part 1)

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The Six Commandments of Value Investing (Part 1)

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EDITOR’S NOTE: Although it has been some time since speaking live with busy colleague Vitaliy Katsenelson CFA, I review his internet material frequently and appreciate this ME-P series contribution. I encourage all ME-P readers to do the same and consider his value investing insights carefully.

By Vitaliy Katsenelson, CFA

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The Six Commandments of Value Investing
3. The market is there to serve you, not the other way around.

Part 1
: The market is there to price stocks on a daily basis, but it doesn’t value them on a daily basis. In the long run (the yardstick here is years, not days or months) the market will value stocks, but in the short run stock price movements are random. 

Despite this randomness, the media will always find a rational explanation for a move. However, trying to understand randomness and predict stock movements in the short run is like trying to have an intelligent conversation with a two-year-old. It may be fun, but it will consume a lot of your time and energy, and the outcome is far from certain. 

Stock fluctuations should be looked upon as a natural and benign feature of the stock market, but only if you know what the asset is worth. To make Mr. Market serve us and not become its slave, here is what we do.

If we know a stock is worth $1, then if its price falls from 50 cents to 30 cents (a 40% decline), that’s a blessing for several reasons: The company can now buy back a lot more of its stock at lower prices, and we can add to our position. After all, it’s 40% cheaper. 

Here is the key, though: You have to make sure that what you thought was worth $1 is still worth $1.

To quote Mike Tyson, “Everyone has a plan till they get punched in the mouth.” How do you remain rational when Mr. Market has just smashed you in the face by repricing your $1 stock from 50 cents to 30 cents? Maybe Mr. Market is right and that company’s fair value was never really $1 but only 40 cents?

To remain rational, we focus on maximizing our Total IQ. I know we were not supposed to have math, especially this early in the book. But indulge me with this little equation: Total IQ = IQ x EQ (where EQ <=1)Before I explain I want to stress this point: Your IQ, EQ, and thus Total IQ will vary from stock to stock and from industry to industry.

Let’s start with IQ.

IQ – our intellectual capacity to analyze problems – will vary with the problem in front of us. Just as we breezed through some subjects in college and struggled with others, our ability to understand the current and future dynamics of various companies and industries will fluctuate as well. This is why we buy stocks that fall within our sphere of competence. We tend to stick with ones where our IQ is the highest.

As I have mentioned before but will continue to repeat: If investing were an exact science – a formulaic process by which you could (in a vacuum) constantly test and retest your hypotheses and repeat your results – then EQ, our emotional quotient, would be irrelevant.

If we were characters from Star Trek – with complete control over our emotions, like Mr. Spock, or lacking emotions entirely, like Lieutenant Commander Data – then our EQ wouldn’t matter. However, investing is not a science and we are humans. We have plenty of emotions, and thus EQ is a very important part of this equation.

Though we usually think about our capacity to analyze problems as being dependable and stable over time, it isn’t.

First, emotions distort probabilities. So, even if my intellectual capacity to analyze a problem is not impacted, my brain may be solving a distorted problem.

Second, my IQ is not constant, and my ability to process information effectively declines under emotional stress. I either lose the big picture or overlook important details. This dilemma is not unique to me; I’m sure it affects all of us to varying degrees.

A friend of mine who is a terrific investor, and who will remain nameless (though his name is George), once told me that he never invests in grocery store stocks because he can’t be rational when he holds them. If we spent some Freudian time with him, we’d probably discover that he experienced a traumatic childhood event at the grocery store (he may have been caught shoplifting a candy bar when he was eight), or he may have had a bad experience with a grocery stock early in his career. The reason for his problem is irrelevant, though. What is important is that he has realized that his high IQ will be impaired by his low EQ if he owns grocery stocks.

The higher my EQ is with regard to a particular company, the more likely my Total IQ will not degrade when things go wrong (or even when they go right). This is why in the little formula above, EQ cannot be greater than 1. In your most emotionally stable state (when EQ = 1), your Total IQ will equal your IQ.

There is a good reason why doctors don’t treat their own children: Their ability to be rational (properly weighing probabilities) may be severely compromised by their emotions. 

CITE: https://www.r2library.com/Resource/Title/082610254

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Investing Recipe for Physician Riches

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The Small Cap – Value Equity Hybrid Model?

[By Staff Reporters]

Modern physician-investors are aware of the financial research that suggests a “small-firm effect,” which shows that stocks of smaller companies may outperform both large firms and the overall market. This seems true, in a stable economy, even after adjusting for the additional risk. The Research also supports buying inexpensive, out-of-favor companies whose returns also significantly exceed the overall market. But, how about combining the two strategies to turbo-charge returns in the modern unstable era?

The Initial Thesis

This was the thesis of an article by Lawrence Creatura and Alyssa Ehrman, entitled “Finding Treasure in Small-Cap Value Stocks” [NAPFA Advisor, back in October 1996, pp.1-10, National Association of Personal Financial Advisors.

The authors explained how value stocks are created by money managers driven by clients to focus on stocks currently in favor and by investors failing to recognize a difference between a “good company” and a “good stock.” Of course, the stock of many good companies is down today, and researchers have demonstrated that “star companies” have underperformed a portfolio of “un-excellent” companies with virtually the same level of risk by some 11% per year; until now!

Small Cap Stocks

Small-cap stocks tend to be undervalued because generally Wall Street does not bother monitoring them and, accordingly, broadcasting positive events to potential investors. Also, managers of large portfolios are virtually excluded from the small-cap stock market because of the minor effect they could have on those portfolios. Most investors tend to shy away from small stocks that trade less frequently than large stocks and which can cause a lack of liquidity; or exacerbate same today.

Small Cap – Value Hybrid

Research on combining the disciplines of small-cap stock investing and value stock investing is still in its infancy. Of particular note is the Fama/French study conducted in 1992, which showed that small, low price-to-book value stocks outperformed larger, higher valued counterparts from 1963 to 1990. They also concluded that size and value do a better job of explaining variation in stock returns than more traditional methods. The authors expanded on the simplistic price-to-book ratio used to identify value stocks by weeding out firms with symptoms of financial weakness. By so doing, they were able to generate annual returns during 1976–1994 in the 18–27% range.

Assessment

All of the above is fine, but what about today? Investing in small, unknown companies selling at discount valuations is not for every physician-investor. But, the potential returns may be worth the effort – and only time will tell.

Conclusion

What do you think? Let us know what’s on your mind with a post, opinion or comment. Is this really a recipe for success, or investing failure? And, feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

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