PROSPECT THEORY: Physician-Client Empowerment for Financial Decision Making

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

By Staff Reporters

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Prospect theory is a psychological and behavioral economics theory developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979. It explains how people make decisions when faced with alternatives involving risk, probability, and uncertainty. According to this theory, decisions are influenced by perceived losses or gains.

Example:

Amanda, a DO client, was just informed by her financial advisor that she needed to re-launch her 403-b retirement plan. Since she was leery about investing, she quietly wondered why she couldn’t DIY. Little does her FA know that she doesn’t intend to follow his advice, anyway! So, what went wrong?

The answer may be that her advisor didn’t deploy a behavioral economics framework to support her decision-making. One such framework is the “prospect theory” model that boils client decision-making into a “three step heuristic.”
 
Prospect theory makes the unspoken biases that we all have more explicit. By identifying all the background assumptions and preferences that clients [patients] bring to the office, decision-making can be crafted so that everyone [family, doctor and patient] or [FA, client and spouse] is on the same page. Briefly, the three steps are:

1. Simplify choices by focusing on the key differences between investment [treatment] options such as stock, bonds, cash, and index funds. 

2. Understanding that clients [patients] prefer greater certainty when it comes to pursuing financial [health] gains and are willing to accept uncertainty when trying to avoid a loss [illness].

3. Cognitive processes lead clients and patients to overestimate the value of their choices thanks to survivor bias, cognitive dissonance, appeals to authority and hindsight biases.

Assessment

Much like healthcare today, the current mass-customized approaches to the financial services industry falls short of recognizing more personalized advisory approaches like prospect theory and assisted client-centered investment decision-making.

 Jaan E. Sidorov MD [Harrisburg, PA]   

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The Decline Bias [Declinism]

By Staff Reporters

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You may have heard the complaint that the internet, blogs, vlogs and social media will be the downfall of information dissemination; but, Socrates reportedly said the same thing about the written word.

Declinism refers to a bias in favor of the past over and above “how things are going.” Similarly, you might know a member of an older generation who prefaces grievances with, “Well, back in my day” before following up with how things are supposedly getting worse.

The decline bias may result from something before — we just don’t like change. People like their worlds to make sense, they like things wrapped up in nice, neat little packages.

Our world is easier to engage in when things make sense to us. When things change, so must the way in which we think about them; and because we are cognitively lazy (Kahenman, 2011; Simon, 1957), we try our best to avoid changing our thought processes.

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HINDSIGHT BIAS: The “Curse of Knowledge”

By Staff Reporters

SPONSOR: http://www.MarcinkoAssociates.com

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The Curse of Knowledge and Hindsight Bias

Similar in ways to the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and to some extent, the false consensus effect, once you (truly) understand a new piece of information, that piece of information is now available to you and often becomes seemingly obvious. It might be easy to forget that there was ever a time you didn’t know this information and so, you assume that others, like yourself, also know this information: the curse of knowledge.

Cite: https://medicalexecutivepost.com/2022/11/18/what-is-the-dunning-kruger-effect/

However, according to colleague Dan Ariely PhD, it is often an unfair assumption that others share the same knowledge. The hindsight bias is similar to the curse of knowledge in that once we have information about an event, it then seems obvious that it was going to happen all along.

I should have seen it [divorce, stock market crash/soar my smoking & lung cancer, unemployment, etc] coming!

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Behavioral Finance for Doctors?

On the Psychology of Investing [Book Review]

By Peter Benedek, PhD CFA

Founder: www.RetirementAction.com

Some of the pioneers of behavioral finance are Drs. Kahneman, Twersky and Thaler. This short introduction to the subject is based on John Nofsinger’s little book entitled “Psychology of Investing” an excellent quick read for all medical professionals or anyone who is interested in learning more about behavioral finance.

Rational Decisions?

Much of modern finance is built on the assumption that investors “make rational decisions” and “are unbiased in their predictions about the future”, however this is not always the case.

Cognitive errors come from (1) prospect theory (people feel good/bad about gain/loss of $500, but not twice as good/bad about a gain/loss of $1,000; they feel worse about a $500 loss than feel good about a $500 gain); (2) mental accounting (meaning that people tend to create separate buckets which they examine individually), (3) Self-deception (e.g. overconfidence), (4) heuristic simplification (shortcuts) and (4) mood can affect ability to reach a logical conclusion.

John Nofsinger’s Book

The following are some of the major chapter headings in Nofsinger’s book, and represent some of the key behavioral finance concepts.

Overconfidence leads to: (1) excessive trading (which in turn results in lower returns due to costs incurred), (2) underestimation of risk (portfolios of decreasing risk were found for single men, married men, married women, and single women), (3) illusion of knowledge (you can get a lot more data nowadays on the internet) and (4) illusion of control (on-line trading).

Pride and Regret leads to: (1) disposition effect (not only selling winners and holding on to the losers, but selling winners too soon- confirming how smart I was, and losers to late- not admitting a bad call, even though selling losers increases one’s wealth due to the tax benefits), (2) reference points (the point from where one measures gains or losses is not necessarily the purchase price, but may perhaps be the most recent 52 week high and it is most likely changing continuously- clearly such a reference point will affect investor’s judgment by perhaps holding on to “loser” too long when in fact it was a winner.)

Considering the Past in decisions about the future, when future outcomes are independent of the past lead to a whole slew of more bad decisions, such as: (1) house money effect (willing to increase the level of risk taken after recent winnings- i.e. playing with house’s money), (2) risk aversion or snake-bite effect (becoming more risk averse after losing money), (3) trying to break-even (at times people will increase their willing to take higher risk to try to recover their losses- e.g. double or nothing), (4) endowment or status quo effect (often people are only prepared to sell something they own for more than they would be willing to buy it- i.e. for investments people tend to do nothing, just hold on to investments they already have) (5) memory and decision making ( decisions are affected by how long ago did the pain/pleasure occur or what was the sequence of pain and pleasure), (6) cognitive dissonance (people avoid important decisions or ignore negative information because of pain associated with circumstances).

Mental Accounting is the act of bucketizing investments and then reviewing the performance of the individual buckets separately (e.g. investing at low savings rate while paying high credit card interest rates).

Examples of mental accounting are: (1) matching costs to benefits (wanting to pay for vacation before taking it and getting paid for work after it was done, even though from perspective of time value of money the opposite should be preferred0, (2) aversion to debt (don’t like long-term debt for short-term benefit), (3) sunk-cost effect (illogically considering non-recoverable costs when making forward-going decisions). In investing, treating buckets separately and ignoring interaction (correlations) induces people not to sell losers (even though they get tax benefits), prevent them from investing in the stock market because it is too risky in isolation (however much less so when looked at as part of the complete portfolio including other asset classes and labor income and occupied real estate), thus they “do not maximize the return for a given level of risk taken).

In building portfolios, assets included should not be chosen on basis of risk and return only, but also correlation; even otherwise well educated individuals make the mistake of assuming that adding a risky asset to a portfolio will increase the overall risk, when in fact the opposite will occur depending on the correlation of the asset to be added with the portfolio (i.e. people misjudge or disregard interactions between buckets, which are key determinants of risk).

This can lead to: (1) building behavioral portfolios (i.e. safety, income, get rich, etc type sub-portfolios, resulting in goal diversification rather than asset diversification), (2) naïve diversification (when aiming for 50:50 stock:bond allocation implementing this as 50:50 in both tax-deferred (401(k)/RRSP) accounts and taxable accounts, rather than placing the bonds in the tax-deferred and stocks in taxable accounts respectively for tax advantages), (3) naïve diversification in retirement accounts (if five investment options are offered then investing 1/5th in each, thus getting an inappropriate level of diversification or no diversification depending on the available choices; or being too heavily invested in one’s employer’s stock).

Representativenes may lead investors to confusing a good company with a good investment (good company may already be overpriced in the market; extrapolating past returns or momentum investing), and familiarity to over-investment in one’s own employer (perhaps inappropriate as when stock tanks one’s job may also be at risk) or industry or country thus not having a properly diversified portfolio.

Emotions can affect investment decisions: mood/feelings/optimism will affect decision to buy or sell risky or conservative assets, even though the mood resulted from matters unrelated to investment. Social interactions such as friends/coworkers/clubs and the media (e.g. CNBC) can lead to herding effects like over (under) valuation.

Financial Strategies

Nofsinger finishes with a final chapter which includes strategies for:

(i) beating the biases: (1) Understand the biases, (2) define your investment objectives, (3) have quantitative investment criteria, i.e. understand why you are buying a specific investor (or even better invest in a passive fashion), (4) diversify among asset classes and within asset classes (and don’t over invest in your employer’s stock), and (5) control your investment environment (check on stock monthly, trade only monthly and review progress toward goals annually).

(ii) using biases for the good: (1) set new employee defaults for retirement plans to being enrolled, (2) get employees to commit some percent of future raises to automatically go toward retirement (save-more-tomorrow).

Assessment

Buy the book (you can get used copies through Amazon). As indicated it is a quick read and occasionally you may even want to re-read it to insure you avoid the biases or use them for the good. Also, the book has long list of references for those inclined to delve into the subject more deeply.

You might even ask “How does all this Behavioral Finance coexist with Efficient Market theory?” and that’s a great question that I’ll leave for another time.

More: SSRN-id2596202

Conclusion

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OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

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Risk Management, Liability Insurance, and Asset Protection Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™8Comprehensive Financial Planning Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™

RIP: Daniel Kahneman PHD

NOBEL PRIZE WINNER AND FATHER OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

By Staff Reporters

DEFINITION: According to Wikipedia, behavioral economics is the study of the psychological, cognitive, emotional, cultural and social factors involved in the decisions of individuals or institutions, and how these decisions deviate from those implied by classical economic theory.

Behavioral economics is primarily concerned with the bounds of rationality of economic agents. Behavioral models typically integrate insights from psychology, neuroscience and microeconomic theory. The study of behavioral economics includes how market decisions are made and the mechanisms that drive public opinion.

Behavioral economics began as a distinct field of study in the 1970s and ’80s, but can be traced back to 18th-century economists, such as Adam Smith, who deliberated how the economic behavior of individuals could be influenced by their desires.

The status of behavioral economics as a subfield of economics is a fairly recent development; the breakthroughs that laid the foundation for it were published through the last three decades of the 20th century. Behavioral economics is still growing as a field, being used increasingly in research and in teaching.

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Daniel Kahneman PhD, the father of behavioral economics, died yesterday at age 90 years old. He’s best known for applying psychology to economics and uncovering biases and mental shortcuts that make people act irrationally, as he chronicled in his best-selling book Thinking, Fast and Slow.

Kahneman, along with his long-time collaborator and friend Amos Tversky PhD, developed “prospect theory,” or loss-aversion theory, which earned him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 (which he shared with fellow economist Vernon Smith). The idea is that people value losses and gains differently, so we feel more bad about losing $100 than we feel good about making the same amount. He applied this theory to investors, who had previously been considered rational decision-makers. It shows up elsewhere, too—for example, golfers putt better when they’re facing the loss of a stroke than when they might gain one.

Two other biases he identified include:

  • The “peak-end rule” that people remember an experience primarily based on how they felt at its most intense moment and the final part of it. It’s why you consider a whole vacation good if the last day was good—or the opposite.
  • The conjunction fallacy where people erroneously think the probability of two things being true is more likely than just one thing, which the famous “Linda the Bank Teller” problem illustrates.

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