ENCORE: The Danger of Groupthink with Endowment Fund Portfolio Managers

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A Historical Look-Back to the Future?

wayne-firebaugh

By Wayne Firebaugh CPA CFP® CMP™

www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.org

It is not unusual for endowment fund managers to compare their endowment allocations to those of peer institutions and that as a result, endowment allocations are often similar to the “average” as reported by one or more survey/consulting firms.

One endowment fund manager expanded this thought by presciently noting that expecting materially different performance with substantially the same allocation is unreasonable [personal communication]. It is anecdotally interesting to wonder whether the seminal study “proving” the importance of asset allocation could have even had a substantially different conclusion. It seems likely that the pensions surveyed in the study had very similar allocations given the human tendency to measure one’s self against peers and to use peers for guidance.

Peer Comparison

Although peer comparisons can be useful in evaluating your institution’s own processes, groupthink can be highly contagious and dangerous.

For example, in the first quarter of 2000, net flows into equity mutual funds were $140.4 billion as compared to net inflows of $187.7 billion for all of 1999. February’s equity fund inflows were a staggering $55.6 billion, the record for single month investments. For all of 1999, total net mutual fund investments were $169.8 billion[1] meaning that investors “rebalanced” out of asset classes such as bonds just in time for the market’s March 24, 2000 peak (as measured by the S&P 500).

Of course, investors are not immune to poor decision making in upward trending markets. In 2001, investors withdrew a then-record amount of $30 billion[2] in September, presumably in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. These investors managed to skillfully “rebalance” their ways out of markets that declined approximately 11.5% during the first several trading sessions after the market reopened, only to reach September 10th levels again after only 19 trading days. In 2002, investors revealed their relentless pursuit of self-destruction when they withdrew a net $27.7 billion from equity funds[3] just before the S&P 500’s 29.9% 2003 growth.

The Travails

Although it is easy to dismiss the travails of mutual fund investors as representing only the performance of amateurs, it is important to remember that institutions are not automatically immune by virtue of being managed by investment professionals.

For example, in the 1960s and early 1970s, common wisdom stipulated that portfolios include the Nifty Fifty stocks that were viewed to be complete companies.  These stocks were considered “one-decision” stocks for which the only decision was how much to buy. Even institutions got caught up in purchasing such current corporate stalwarts as Joe Schlitz Brewing, Simplicity Patterns, and Louisiana Home & Exploration.

Collective market groupthink pushed these stocks to such prices that Price Earnings ratios routinely exceeded 50. Subsequent disappointing performance of this strategy only revealed that common wisdom is often neither common nor wisdom.

Senate house conference committee meets wall street reform

[Wall Street Reform?]

More Current Examples

More recently, the New York Times reported on June 21, 2007, that Bear Stearns had managed to forestall the demise of the Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit Strategies and the related Enhanced Leveraged Fund.

The two funds held mortgage-backed debt securities of almost $2 billion many of which were in the sub-prime market.  To compound the problem, the funds borrowed much of the money used to purchase these securities.

The firms who had provided the loans to make these purchases represent some of the smartest names on Wall Street, including  JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, and Deutsche Bank.[4]

Assessment

Despite its efforts Bear Stearns had to inform investors less than a week later on June 27th that these two funds had collapsed.

Conclusion

Is this same Groupthink mentality happening on Wall Street, today? Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

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[1]   2001 Fact Book, Investment Company Institute.

[2]   Id.

[3]   2003 Fact Book, Investment Company Institute.

[4]    Bajaj, Vikas and Creswell, Julie. “Bear Stearns Staves off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds.”
New York Times, June 21, 2007.

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Beware Medical and Money Management ‘Groupthink’

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Helping Doctors Understand Peer Comparisons

By J. Wayne Firebaugh CPA, CFP® CMP™

By Dr. David E. Marcinko MBA, CMP™

Source: http://www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.org

More than a few mutual, hedge and endowment fund managers have noted that they commonly compare their endowment and portfolio allocations to those of peer institutions and that as a result, allocations are often similar to the “average” as reported by one or more surveys/consulting firms.

One interviewed endowment fund manager expanded this thought by presciently noting that expecting materially different performance with substantially the same allocation is unreasonable. It is anecdotally interesting to wonder whether any “seminal” study “proving” the importance of asset allocation could have even had a substantially different conclusion. It seems likely that the pensions and funds surveyed in these types of studies have very similar allocations given the human tendency to measure one-self against peers and to use peers for guidance.

This is a truism in medicine as well as the financial services sector.

Understanding Peer Comparisons

Although peer comparisons can be useful in evaluating your portfolio, or your hospital or medical practice’s own processes, groupthink can be highly contagious and dangerous.

For historical example, in the first quarter of 2000, net flows into equity mutual funds were $140.4 billion as compared to net inflows of $187.7 billion for all of 1999. February’s equity fund inflows were a staggering $55.6 billion, the record for single month investments. For all of 1999, total net mutual fund investments were $169.8 billion[1] meaning that investors “rebalanced” out of asset classes such as bonds just in time for the market’s March 24, 2000 peak (as measured by the S&P 500).

Of course, physicians and investors are not immune to poor decision making in upward trending markets. In 2001, investors withdrew a then-record amount of $30 billion[2] in September, presumably in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. These investors managed to skillfully “rebalance” their ways out of markets that declined approximately 11.5% during the first several trading sessions after the market reopened, only to reach September 10th levels again after only 19 trading days. In 2002, investors revealed their relentless pursuit of self-destruction when they withdrew a net $27.7 billion from equity funds[3] just before the S&P 500’s 29.9% 2003 growth.

Amateurs versus Professionals [is there such a thing?]

Although it is easy to dismiss the travails of mutual fund investors as representing only the performance of amateurs, it is important to remember that institutions are not automatically immune by virtue of being managed by investment professionals.

For example, in the 1960s and early 1970s, common wisdom stipulated that portfolios include the Nifty Fifty stocks that were viewed to be complete companies.  These stocks were considered “one-decision” stocks for which the only decision was how much to buy. Even institutions got caught up in purchasing such current corporate stalwarts as Joe Schlitz Brewing, Simplicity Patterns, and Louisiana Home & Exploration.  Collective market groupthink pushed these stocks to such prices that Price Earnings ratios routinely exceeded 50 [nothing in the internet age]. Subsequent disappointing performance of this strategy only revealed that common wisdom is often neither common nor wisdom.

The Bear Sterns Example

Recall that The New York Times reported on June 21, 2007, that Bear Stearns had managed to forestall the demise of the Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit Strategies and the related Enhanced Leveraged Fund.  The two funds held mortgage-backed debt securities of almost $2 billion many of which were in the sub-prime market.  To compound the problem, the funds borrowed much of the money used to purchase these securities.  The firms who had provided the loans to make these purchases represented some of the smartest names on Wall Street, including JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, and Deutsche Bank.[4]  Despite its efforts Bear Stearns had to inform investors less than a week later on June 27 that these two funds had collapsed. The subsequent fate of these firms, and the history of the past two years, need not be repeated to appreciate that the king surely had no clothes.

Assessment

What broader message lies in this post relative to such medical initiatives as P4P, various clinical quality improvement endeavors and benchmarks, hospital peer-review, PROs, Medicare compliance, etc?  

Conclusion

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

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References


[1]   2001 Fact Book, Investment Company Institute.

[2]   Id.

[3]   2003 Fact Book, Investment Company Institute.

[4]    Bajaj, Vikas and Creswell, Julie. “Bear Stearns Staves off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds.” New York Times, June 21, 2007.

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Take the Hospital Endowment Fund Management Challenge!

Calling all Financial Advisors – Are You CMP™ Worthy?

By Staff ReportersBecome a CMP

After conducting a comprehensive fundraising program, the Hoowa Medical Center received initial gifts of $50 million to establish an endowment. Its status as the community’s only trauma center and neonatal intensive care unit causes it to provide substantial amounts of unreimbursed care every year. This phenomenon, together with the declining reimbursements and an estimated 6% increase in operating costs, leaves the Center with a budgeted cash shortfall of $4 million next fiscal year. Although the new endowment’s funds are available to cover such operating shortfalls, the donors also expect their gifts to provide perpetual support for a leading-edge medical institution.

The Treasurer

Bill, the Center’s treasurer, has been appointed to supervise the day-to-day operations of the endowment. One of his initial successes was convincing his investment committee to retain a consultant who specializes in managing endowment investments. The consultant has recommended a portfolio that is expected to generate long-term investment returns of approximately 10%. The allocation reflects the consultant’s belief that endowments should generally have long-term investment horizons. This belief results in an allocation that has a significant equity bias. Achieving the anticipated long-term rate of returns would allow the endowment to transfer sufficient funds to the operating accounts to cover the next year’s anticipated deficit. However, this portfolio allocation carries risk of principal loss as well as risk that the returns will be positive but somewhat less than anticipated. In fact, Bill’s analysis suggests that the allocation could easily generate a return ranging from a 5% loss to a 25% gain over the following year.

The Committee

Although the committee authorized Bill to hire the consultant, he knows that he will have some difficulty selling the allocation recommendation to his committee members. In particular, he has two polarizing committee members around whom other committee members tend to organize into factions. John, a wealthy benefactor whose substantial inheritances allow him to support pet causes such as the Center, believes that a more conservative allocation that allows the endowment to preserve principal is the wisest course. Although such a portfolio would likely generate a lower long-term return, John believes that this approach more closely represents the donors’ goal that the endowment provide a reliable and lasting source of support to the Center. For this committee faction, Bill hopes to use MVO to illustrate the ability of diversification to minimize overall portfolio risk while simultaneously increasing returns. He also plans to share the results of the MCS stress testing he performed suggesting that the alternative allocation desired by these “conservative” members of his committee would likely cause the endowment to run out of money within 20 to 25 years.

The Polarizer

Another polarizing figure on Bill’s committee is Marcie, an entrepreneur who took enormous risks but succeeded in taking her software company public in a transaction that netted her millions. She and other like-minded committee members enthusiastically subscribe to the “long-term” mantra and believe that the endowment can afford the 8% payout ratio necessary to fund next year’s projected deficit. Marcie believes that the excess of the anticipated long-term rate of return over the next year’s operating deficit still provides some cushion against temporary market declines. Bill is certain that Marcie will focus on the upside performance potential. Marcie will also argue that, in any event, additional alternative investments could be used as necessary to increase the portfolio’s long-term rate of return. Bill has prepared a comparative analysis of payout policies illustrating the potential impact of portfolio fluctuations on the sustainability of future payout levels. Bill is also concerned that Marcie and her supporters may not fully understand some of the trade-offs inherent in certain of the alternative investment vehicles to which they desire to increase the allocated funds.

Key Issues:

1. Given the factors described in the case study (anticipated long-term investment return, anticipated inflation rate, and operating deficit) how should Bill recommend compromise with respect to maximum sustainable payout rates?

2. How should Bill incorporate the following items into his risk management strategy?

a. educating the committee regarding types of risk affecting individual investments, classes, and the entire portfolio;

b. measuring risk and volatility;

c. provisions for periodic portfolio rebalancing;

d. using tactical asset allocation; and,

e. developing and implementing a contingency plan.

3) What additional steps should Bill take to form a group consensus regarding the appropriate level of endowment investment risk?

4) What additional elements should Bill add to his presentation to target the concerns of the “conservative” and “aggressive” committee members, respectively?

Assessment

And so, financial advisors, planners and wealth managers; are you up to answering this challenge? We dare you to respond! Visit: www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.com

Conclusion

And so, your thoughts and comments on this Medical Executive-Post are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, be sure to subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

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Hospital Loses Twenty-Five Million Dollar Investment

Investment Losses Cited

By Staff Reportersho-journal8 

www.HealthcareFinancials.com

According to Brian Bandell, of the South Florida Business Journal on May 20 2009, Baptist Health South Florida [BHSF] could not climb out of the red in the fiscal second quarter that ended March 31, 2009. Its investment losses wiped out operating income, according to a report the nonprofit issued to its bondholders.

Investment Losses Nix Operating Income

The Miami-based health care provider lost $24.8 million on operating revenue of $530.2 million in its second quarter. That’s improved from a loss of $26.8 million on operating revenues of $470.2 million in the same quarter of 2008.

Link: http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2009/05/18/daily47.html

Assessment

Perhaps the BHSF CFO and CEO should read Tab 8, Chapter 3 on: Hospital Endowment Fund Management, by J. Wayne Firebaugh, Jr; CPA, CFP® CMP™ in Healthcare Organizations [Financial Management Strategies]?

T.O.C. Link: toc_ho[1]

Conclusion

And so, your thoughts, post and comments on this Medical Executive-Post are appreciated; especially from hospital CEOs and major health institutional CFOs and CIOs, etc. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, be sure to subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

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Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com  or Bio: www.stpub.com/pubs/authors/MARCINKO.htm

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