• Member Statistics

    • 786,985 Colleagues-to-Date [Sponsored by a generous R&D grant from iMBA, Inc.]
  • David E. Marcinko [Editor-in-Chief]

    As a former Dean and appointed Distinguished University Professor and Endowed Department Chair, Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA was a NYSE broker and investment banker for a decade who was respected for his unique perspectives, balanced contrarian thinking and measured judgment to influence key decision makers in strategic education, health economics, finance, investing and public policy management.

    Dr. Marcinko is originally from Loyola University MD, Temple University in Philadelphia and the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center in PA; as well as Oglethorpe University and Emory University in Georgia, the Atlanta Hospital & Medical Center; Kellogg-Keller Graduate School of Business and Management in Chicago, and the Aachen City University Hospital, Koln-Germany. He became one of the most innovative global thought leaders in medical business entrepreneurship today by leveraging and adding value with strategies to grow revenues and EBITDA while reducing non-essential expenditures and improving dated operational in-efficiencies.

    Professor David Marcinko was a board certified surgical fellow, hospital medical staff President, public and population health advocate, and Chief Executive & Education Officer with more than 425 published papers; 5,150 op-ed pieces and over 135+ domestic / international presentations to his credit; including the top ten [10] biggest drug, DME and pharmaceutical companies and financial services firms in the nation. He is also a best-selling Amazon author with 30 published academic text books in four languages [National Institute of Health, Library of Congress and Library of Medicine].

    Dr. David E. Marcinko is past Editor-in-Chief of the prestigious “Journal of Health Care Finance”, and a former Certified Financial Planner® who was named “Health Economist of the Year” in 2010. He is a Federal and State court approved expert witness featured in hundreds of peer reviewed medical, business, economics trade journals and publications [AMA, ADA, APMA, AAOS, Physicians Practice, Investment Advisor, Physician’s Money Digest and MD News] etc.

    Later, Dr. Marcinko was a vital recruited BOD member of several innovative companies like Physicians Nexus, First Global Financial Advisors and the Physician Services Group Inc; as well as mentor and coach for Deloitte-Touche and other start-up firms in Silicon Valley, CA.

    As a state licensed life, P&C and health insurance agent; and dual SEC registered investment advisor and representative, Marcinko was Founding Dean of the fiduciary and niche focused CERTIFIED MEDICAL PLANNER® chartered professional designation education program; as well as Chief Editor of the three print format HEALTH DICTIONARY SERIES® and online Wiki Project.

    Dr. David E. Marcinko’s professional memberships included: ASHE, AHIMA, ACHE, ACME, ACPE, MGMA, FMMA, FPA and HIMSS. He was a MSFT Beta tester, Google Scholar, “H” Index favorite and one of LinkedIn’s “Top Cited Voices”.

    Marcinko is “ex-officio” and R&D Scholar-on-Sabbatical for iMBA, Inc. who was recently appointed to the MedBlob® [military encrypted medical data warehouse and health information exchange] Advisory Board.

    entrepreneur

    Frontal_lobe_animation

  • ME-P Information & Content Channels

  • ME-P Archives Silo [2006 – 2020]

  • Ann Miller RN MHA [Managing Editor]

    ME-P SYNDICATIONS:
    WSJ.com,
    CNN.com,
    Forbes.com,
    WashingtonPost.com,
    BusinessWeek.com,
    USNews.com, Reuters.com,
    TimeWarnerCable.com,
    e-How.com,
    News Alloy.com,
    and Congress.org

    Comprehensive Financial Planning Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners(TM)

    Product Details

    Product Details

    Product Details

  • CERTIFIED MEDICAL PLANNER® program

    New "Self-Directed" Study Option SinceJanuary 1st, 2018
  • Most Recent ME-Ps

  • PodiatryPrep.org


    BOARD CERTIFICATION EXAM STUDY GUIDES
    Lower Extremity Trauma
    [Click on Image to Enlarge]

  • ME-P Free Advertising Consultation

    The “Medical Executive-Post” is about connecting doctors, health care executives and modern consulting advisors. It’s about free-enterprise, business, practice, policy, personal financial planning and wealth building capitalism. We have an attitude that’s independent, outspoken, intelligent and so Next-Gen; often edgy, usually controversial. And, our consultants “got fly”, just like U. Read it! Write it! Post it! “Medical Executive-Post”. Call or email us for your FREE advertising and sales consultation TODAY [770.448.0769]

    Product Details

    Product Details

  • Medical & Surgical e-Consent Forms

    ePodiatryConsentForms.com
  • iMBA R&D Services

    Commission a Subject Matter Expert Report [$250-$999]January 1st, 2019
    Medical Clinic Valuations * Endowment Fund Management * Health Capital Formation * Investment Policy Statement Analysis * Provider Contracting & Negotiations * Marketplace Competition * Revenue Cycle Enhancements; and more! HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
  • iMBA Inc., OFFICES

    Suite #5901 Wilbanks Drive, Norcross, Georgia, 30092 USA [1.770.448.0769]. Our location is real and we are now virtually enabled to assist new long distance clients and out-of-town colleagues.

  • ME-P Publishing

  • SEEKING INDUSTRY INFO PARTNERS?

    If you want the opportunity to work with leading health care industry insiders, innovators and watchers, the “ME-P” may be right for you? We are unbiased and operate at the nexus of theoretical and applied R&D. Collaborate with us and you’ll put your brand in front of a smart & tightly focused demographic; one at the forefront of our emerging healthcare free marketplace of informed and professional “movers and shakers.” Our Ad Rate Card is available upon request [770-448-0769].

  • Reader Comments, Quips, Opinions, News & Updates

  • Start-Up Advice for Businesses, DRs and Entrepreneurs

    ImageProxy “Providing Management, Financial and Business Solutions for Modernity”
  • Up-Trending ME-Ps

  • Capitalism and Free Enterprise Advocacy

    Whether you’re a mature CXO, physician or start-up entrepreneur in need of management, financial, HR or business planning information on free markets and competition, the "Medical Executive-Post” is the online place to meet for Capitalism 2.0 collaboration. Support our online development, and advance our onground research initiatives in free market economics, as we seek to showcase the brightest Next-Gen minds. ******************************************************************** THE ME-P DISCLAIMER: Posts, comments and opinions do not necessarily represent iMBA, Inc., but become our property after submission. Copyright © 2006 to-date. iMBA, Inc allows colleges, universities, medical and financial professionals and related clinics, hospitals and non-profit healthcare organizations to distribute our proprietary essays, photos, videos, audios and other documents; etc. However, please review copyright and usage information for each individual asset before submission to us, and/or placement on your publication or web site. Attestation references, citations and/or back-links are required. All other assets are property of the individual copyright holder.
  • OIG Fraud Warnings

    Beware of health insurance marketplace scams OIG's Most Wanted Fugitives at oig.hhs.gov

Morgan Stanley Peddled Security Its Own Employee Called ‘Nuclear Holocaust’

Join Our Mailing List
An Explosive Charge
By Jesse Eisinger Pro Publica
###
A new lawsuit suggests employees at Morgan Stanley understood the housing market was in trouble and exploited that knowledge to bet against securities and unload garbage investments on the unsuspecting.

The bank denies wrongdoing.

Bank

Link: Explosive Charge: Morgan Stanley Peddled Security Its Own Employee Called ‘Nuclear Holocaust’

Conclusion

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

Product Details  Product Details

***

Misdirection in Goldman Sachs’s Housing Short

Goldman Sachs appears to be trying to clear its name

By Jesse Eisinger

ProPublica, June 15, 2011, 3:10 pm

Join Our Mailing List 

The compelling Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report on the financial crisis [1] is wrong, the bank says. Goldman Sachs didn’t have a Big Short against the housing market.

About The Trade

In this column, co-published with New York Times’ DealBook, I monitor the financial markets to hold companies, executives and government officials accountable for their actions. Tips? Praise? Contact me at jesse@propublica.org

But the size of Goldman’s short is irrelevant.

No one disputes that, by 2007, the firm had pivoted to reduce its exposure from mortgages and mortgage securities and had begun shorting the market on some scale. There’s nothing wrong with that. Don’t we want banks to reduce their risk when they see trouble ahead, as Goldman did in the mortgage markets?

Nor should shorting itself be seen as a bad thing. Putting money behind a bet that a stock (or bond or commodity or derivative) is overpriced is necessary for the efficient functioning of capital markets. Short-sellers can keep prices from getting out of whack and help deflate bubbles.

The problem isn’t that Goldman went short and reduced risk — it’s how.

It is How … Short?

To establish many of its short positions, the Senate report says, Goldman created new securities, backed them with its good name, and then strung together misleading statements to its customers about what it was actually doing. By shorting the way it did, the bank perverted the market instead of correcting it.

Take Hudson Mezzanine, a $2 billion collateralized debt obligation created by Goldman in 2006 [2]. In marketing material, the firm wrote that “Goldman Sachs has aligned incentives with the Hudson program.”

I suppose that was technically true: Goldman had made a small investment in the C.D.O. and therefore had an aligned incentive with the other investors. But the material failed to mention the firm’s much larger bet against the C.D.O. — a huge adverse incentive to its customers’ interests.

Goldman told investors that the Hudson assets had been “sourced from the Street,” which most investors would understand to mean that Goldman had purchased the assets from other broker-dealers. In fact, all the assets had come from Goldman’s own balance sheet, the Senate report found.

In his April 2010 testimony to the Senate, Goldman’s chief executive, Lloyd C. Blankfein, argued that Goldman was merely making a market in these securities and derivatives, matching willing and sophisticated buyers and sellers. But, Goldman was acting like an underwriter, not a market maker.

As the underwriter, Goldman threw its marketing muscle behind Hudson Mezzanine and other C.D.O.’s. When the bank’s salespeople ran into trouble selling the securities, they begged for help from the executives who created them. One requested material to give to clients about “how great” the sector was. One needed the aid to get a client to invest, to be “THERE AND IN SIZE,” according to e-mails cited in the report.

Sometimes, Goldman took advantage of the opaque markets. According to the Senate report, Goldman executives had extensive concerns about the prices of its 2007 Timberwolf C.D.O. Goldman sold the C.D.O. securities anyway, often at higher prices than it had them recorded on its books. In summer 2007, Goldman marked some Timberwolf assets at 55 cents on the dollar, but sold similar securities to an Israeli bank at 78.25 cents at the same time, according to the report. Oh, well, tough luck!

Goldman’s Famous Mantra

For decades, Goldman’s famous mantra was to be “long-term greedy” and a central element of that was putting customers first. In these C.D.O.’s, the bank’s customers were “only first in the same way that on Thanksgiving, the turkey is first,” a former C.D.O. professional told me.

Goldman declined to address these specific disclosures from the report. A spokesman maintained the firm fulfilled its obligations to buyers of these kinds of C.D.O.’s, which were made up of derivatives. The customers were large and sophisticated investors who knew that one side had to be long while the other was short. And they knew, or should have known, that Goldman might be on the other side.

“It was fully disclosed and well known to investors that banks that arranged synthetic C.D.O.’s took the initial short position,” a spokesman wrote in an e-mail.

True, but few thought that the bank that had created and hawked the C.D.O.’s expected them to fail.

Goldman’s techniques harmed the capital markets. Goldman brought something into the world that didn’t exist before. Instead of selling something — thereby decreasing the price or supply of it — and giving the market a signal that it was less desirable, Goldman did the opposite. The firm created more mortgage investments and gave the world the signal that there was more demand, for C.D.O.’s and for the mortgages that backed them.

Assessment

By shorting C.D.O.’s, Goldman also distorted the pricing of the underlying assets. The bank could have taken the securities it owned and sold them en masse in a fairly negotiated sale, though it likely would have gotten less for them than it was able to make by shorting the C.D.O.’s it created.

Because of Goldman’s actions, the financial system took greater losses than there otherwise would have been. Goldman’s form of shorting prolonged the boom and made the crisis that followed much worse.

Goldman executives surely hope to change the subject from the firm’s specific actions to a more general discussion of how much and when it shorted. We shouldn’t let them.

Link: http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/misdirection-in-goldman-sachss-housing-short/

Conclusion

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Link: http://feeds.feedburner.com/HealthcareFinancialsthePostForcxos

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

DICTIONARIES: http://www.springerpub.com/Search/marcinko
PHYSICIANS: www.MedicalBusinessAdvisors.com
PRACTICES: www.BusinessofMedicalPractice.com
HOSPITALS: http://www.crcpress.com/product/isbn/9781466558731
CLINICS: http://www.crcpress.com/product/isbn/9781439879900
BLOG: www.MedicalExecutivePost.com
FINANCE: Financial Planning for Physicians and Advisors
INSURANCE: Risk Management and Insurance Strategies for Physicians and Advisors

Product DetailsProduct DetailsProduct Details

Product Details  Product Details

At a Time of Needed Financial Overhaul

A Leadership Vacuum

By Jesse Eisinger
ProPublica, May 18, 2011, 3:10 p.m.

Join Our Mailing List 

After the worst crisis since the Great Depression, President Obama has unleashed an unusual force to regulate the financial system: a bunch of empty seats [1].

With Sheila C. Bair soon to leave her post at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Obama administration will have five major bank regulatory positions either unfilled or staffed with acting directors.

About The Trade

In this column, co-published with New York Times’ DealBook, I monitor the financial markets to hold companies, executives and government officials accountable for their actions. Tips? Praise? Contact me at jesse@propublica.org

The administration has inexplicably left open the vice chairman for banking supervision, a new position at the Federal Reserve created by the Dodd-Frank Act, despite having a candidate that many people think is an obvious choice: Daniel K. Tarullo [2]. The new Consumer Financial Products Board chairman is unnamed. There are some lower-level positions that don’t have candidates, including the head of the Treasury’s Office of Financial Research and the Financial Stability Oversight Council insurance post.

Perhaps most important, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, is being headed by an acting comptroller, John Walsh, who took over the agency last August. Nine months have passed without a leader who might better reflect the Obama administration’s views on banking regulation, a time lag made worse by the office’s coddling of the banks [3] even as they have acknowledged rampant abuse and negligence in the foreclosure process.

The vacancies come at a time that calls for stiffer regulatory examination. The financial regulatory system was remade under Dodd-Frank and requires strong leaders to put the changes into effect. Though the acting heads insist they feel empowered to make serious decisions, they have roughly the same authority as substitute high school teachers.

The Obama Administration

Supposedly, the Obama administration is getting close to naming people to head the comptroller’s office and the F.D.I.C. But we’ve been hearing that for a while. In April, Barbara A. Rehm of American Banker wrote that the administration was working on a big package of nominations to send to the Hill all at once. A month later, we’re still twiddling our thumbs in anticipation.

So what’s going on?

In a vacuum of leadership, conspiracy theories arise. One is that Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is making a power grab and doesn’t mind that these roles aren’t filled. The idea is that he is asserting his influence over the Dodd-Frank rule-making process. A former adviser to Mr. Geithner dismissed that notion as ridiculous, and that’s persuasive to me. It seems too Machiavellian by half.

If it’s not Mr. Geithner, then who or what is responsible for the vacancies? Not surprisingly, people close to the administration blame Republicans. The nomination process has become hopelessly broken in Washington. Even low-level appointments are now deeply partisan affairs, the playthings of score-settling senators with memories like elephants and the social responsibility of hyenas (which probably insults hyenas).

The Obama administration put up Peter A. Diamond for a position on the Federal Reserve board. Winning a little something called the Nobel Prize [4] hasn’t helped him with confirmation, however Sen. Richard Shelby, the powerful Alabama Republican and ranking member of the banking committee, is standing in his way. The senator also quashed the nomination [5] of Joseph A. Smith Jr. to head the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

Blame Game

But much of the blame for this situation lies with the Obama administration. It’s almost as if the president and his staff have thrown up their hands. The administration has had trouble finding good candidates who are willing to go through the vetting process and has shied away from fights. It also hasn’t seeded the ground or supported the nominations it has made, people complain.

A Democratic Senate staff member confided worry to me about the fate of Mark Wetjen, whom the administration nominated last week as a candidate for a seat on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. “They didn’t shop it and they didn’t get buy-in,” the staff member said. “The administration doesn’t seem to be putting any sort of effort into it.”

Making these appointments will help answer a question: Where does Mr. Obama stand on financial regulation?

With the Geithner appointment, the president chose early on the path of continuity over muscular regulation. Immediately, the Treasury secretary became the personification of every Obama financial policy. Mr. Geithner remains the most politically costly appointment Mr. Obama has made, saddling him with all the Bush presidency’s financial crisis decisions. After all, Mr. Geithner, as head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was intimately involved in the emergency actions of September 2008. Republicans made great hay tying Democrats to the Wall Street bailouts in the 2010 midterm elections. Now, of course, Republicans are leading Democrats in Wall Street campaign donations [6].

With these positions unfilled, Mr. Obama is losing out on a political opportunity to draw a line between himself and his opposition.

Assessment

But it’s more important than that. Allowing these vacancies to linger drains leadership from the financial overhaul at the exact moment when it is needed most.

Link: http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/at-a-time-of-/0763745790

Channel Surfing the ME-P

Have you visited our other topic channels? Established to facilitate idea exchange and link our community together, the value of these topics is dependent upon your input. Please take a minute to visit. And, to prevent that annoying spam, we ask that you register. It is fast, free and secure.

Conclusion

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

Product DetailsProduct DetailsProduct Details

Product Details  Product Details

   Product Details 

Vows of Change at Moody’s

But, the Flaws Remain the Same

By Jesse Eisinger ProPublica | @eisingerj 

Join Our Mailing List

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, nobody has gone to prison and there haven’t been any serious structural changes in the financial system. But at least everyone involved feels bad about it and has vowed to change, right? For Moody’s Investors Service, those pledges are empty, Bill Harrington says.

In this column, co-published with New York Times’ DealBook, I monitor the financial markets to hold companies, executives and government officials accountable for their actions.

A Window to the Debacle

Mr. Harrington was an analyst in the structured finance group at Moody’s for more than a decade, much of it spent rating collateralized debt obligations. He worked at Moody’s until the middle of last year, although he left the C.D.O. group in 2006. In his job, he had a window on the biggest debacle in the history of credit ratings. Companies like his allowed banks to pass off hundreds of billions worth of paper onto investors by waving their magic wands and deeming the securities investment-worthy.

Since then, the government has tried to change the ratings agencies. The Dodd-Frank financial reform law has some bold measures, like making the ratings firms liable for their judgments. Unfortunately, the rules are in danger of not being enforced because of budget constraints and resistance from the agencies.

But the biggest problems at Moody’s may have been cultural. The dominant ethos during the boom, instilled by Brian M. Clarkson, the former president and chief operating officer [1], was that customer service was Job 1. And the customers were the bankers.

Banker Customers

The ability for bankers to run the show has long been an obvious flaw in the ratings system for structured products. Investment banks create the securities and benefit when they receive generous ratings. Banks pay the agencies that supply the ratings. Yet the agencies are somehow supposed to hold the line with the people who are responsible for their paychecks.

To Moody’s credit, Mr. Clarkson is now gone. To Moody’s discredit, however, his philosophy is largely still in place, at least according to Mr. Harrington.

To the last day Mr. Harrington was there, he says, bankers remained hard-charging and aggressive advocates for their deals, sometimes to the point of abusing the analysts.

Wall Street ain’t beanbag, so that’s not surprising. The troubling aspect is that the Moody’s bosses acted like disinterested brokers between two sides in disputes with analysts, instead of standing up for the analysts and defending their independence. “That was the standard operating procedure that got worse and worse. We didn’t get the benefit of the doubt,” Mr. Harrington said.

When I asked Moody’s about Mr. Harrington’s experiences, a spokesman wrote in an e-mail: “We take strong exception to your characterization of Moody’s culture. We have always had an unwavering culture of integrity, analytical independence and objectivity and that culture has only grown stronger since the financial crisis.” He pointed to numerous efforts at Moody’s to improve the ratings process and to bolster Moody’s procedures.

In the spring of 2009, Mr. Harrington was working on a deal and a banker was persistently calling him. He returned the first call, but had other work that day and didn’t return the next two calls right away. “I thought caller ID served a purpose,” he said wryly.

Soon after, his boss alerted him to a call he’d received from Michael Kanef, the head of compliance. Mr. Kanef wanted to know why Mr. Harrington hadn’t returned the banker’s call. Mr. Harrington was shocked. Why was the head of compliance getting involved? But he got the apparent message: Analysts are to lean over backward for the bankers. That had been Mr. Clarkson’s philosophy, and now it was his successors’.

“The culture persists — and it’s being enforced by compliance department,” Mr. Harrington said.

So who is Mr. Kanef? Before he was the head of regulatory affairs and compliance, he was in charge of ratings on residential mortgage-backed securities [2]. Did such an executive deserve a promotion?

And then there is Raymond W. McDaniel, the chief executive throughout the housing boom, the bust and the entire financial crisis. He remains at the helm. And he had to swallow the bitter pill of more than $9 million in compensation last year. Indeed, most of Moody’s top management has been in place through the crisis.

Moody’s didn’t make Mr. Kanef or Mr. McDaniel available for comment.

The Blame Game

So if Moody’s doesn’t think the executives who ran the company were responsible for its collapse in reputation and contribution to the multitrillion-dollar financial crisis, who do they think is to blame? The analysts, Mr. Harrington says. The hard-working, low-level minions with little decision-making power.

Mr. McDaniel has conceded that sometimes “we drink the Kool-Aid.”

But that hardly makes the analysts to blame.

“If some analysts drank the Kool-Aid, it was only because management mixed and stirred it up and threatened that analysts wouldn’t get to heaven on the spaceship unless he or she drank it,” Mr. Harrington said.

Moody’s has recognized it has a disaster on its hands — a public relations disaster. Clients — the investors who use ratings — have been losing faith in the agencies. Mr. Harrington said that Moody’s executives marched analysts into meetings to explain how they were going to tell their clients about how much Moody’s had grown and learned from its mistakes. It was as if they were in “Communist re-education camp,” he said.

At one of these meetings, an analyst asked if they could be given training in how to deal with banker abuse, Mr. Harrington recalls. The suggestion was immediately shot down by the executive running the meeting.

Moody’s says that its retraining efforts are part of its continuing efforts to reach out to investors to improve its ratings.

Assessment

When Moody’s executives make public presentations, as when Mr. McDaniel testified [3] in front of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the overarching theme is that the agency’s problem was limited to the housing-related structured finance. Few people saw how fast and deep the housing market would crash. How could the ratings agencies?

A few weeks ago, Alan Greenspan penned an instantly notorious line: “With notably rare exceptions,” [4] he wrote, unfettered financial markets have worked well. Moody’s persists in believing that with notably rare exceptions, so too have credit ratings.

Full Article: http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/vows-of-change-at-moodys-but-the-flaws-remain-the-same/

Conclusion

And so, your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Link: http://feeds.feedburner.com/HealthcareFinancialsthePostForcxos

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

Our Other Print Books and Related Information Sources:

Health Dictionary Series: http://www.springerpub.com/Search/marcinko

Practice Management: http://www.springerpub.com/product/9780826105752

Physician Financial Planning: http://www.jbpub.com/catalog/0763745790

Medical Risk Management: http://www.jbpub.com/catalog/9780763733421

Healthcare Organizations: www.HealthcareFinancials.com

Physician Advisors: www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.com

Subscribe Now: Did you like this Medical Executive-Post, or find it helpful, interesting and informative? Want to get the latest ME-Ps delivered to your email box each morning? Just subscribe using the link below. You can unsubscribe at any time. Security is assured.

Link: http://feeds.feedburner.com/HealthcareFinancialsthePostForcxos

Sponsors Welcomed: And, credible sponsors and like-minded advertisers are always welcomed.

Link: https://healthcarefinancials.wordpress.com/2007/11/11/advertise

Product DetailsProduct DetailsProduct Details       

Product Details  Product Details

Where Are the Financial Crisis Prosecutions?

The White Collar Slump?

By Jesse Eisinger
ProPublica: jesse@propublica.org

Join Our Mailing List 

You may have noticed that prosecutors in this country are in something of a white-collar slump lately.

The stock options backdating prosecutions have largely been a bust [1], not because it wasn’t a true scandal. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Justice Department investigated more than 100 companies. Over a hundred took accounting restatements. Yet only a handful of executives went to prison, with some high-profile cases fizzling out. Prosecutors also stumbled in other high priority corporate fraud prosecutions, like the KPMG [2] tax shelter and the stock-exchange specialists [3] cases.

Bear Sterns

The most spectacular prosecutorial flameout [4] was the case against the Bear Stearns hedge fund managers. The consequences of that disaster are still reverberating. The United States attorney’s office in Brooklyn rushed to haul low-level executives in front of a jury based on a few seemingly incriminating emails. The defense was easily able to convince jurors that these represented only out-of-context glimpses of fear as markets swooned, not a conspiracy to mislead. But, now we have a supposedly new push: the insider trading scandal.

Insider Trading

The United States attorney in Manhattan, Preet Bharara, and the United States Attorney, General Eric H. Holder Jr., are hyping their efforts. “Illegal insider trading is rampant and may even be on the rise,” Mr. Bharara dubiously pronounced in a speech [5] in October. The Feds are raiding [6] hedge funds and publicly celebrating their criminal investigations related to insider trading.

The storyline is that Wall Street now lives in fear. Hedge fund managers’ phones might be tapped, any stray remark is suspect, and old trades are being exhumed so that the entrails can be examined.

In fact, plenty of folks on Wall Street are happy about the investigation. A scant few — the ones with clean consciences — like the idea that the world of special access to favorable tips is being cleaned up.

But others are pleased for a different reason: They realize the investigation is a sideshow.

All the hype carries an air of defensiveness. Everyone is wondering: Where are the investigations related to the financial crisis?

Enron, Lehman, Merrill, Citigroup and Others

John Hueston, a former lead Enron prosecutor, wonders: “Have they committed the resources in the right place? Do these scandals warrant apparent national priority status?”

Nobody from Lehman, Merrill Lynch or Citigroup has been charged criminally with anything. No top executives at Bear Stearns have been indicted. All former American International Group executives are running free. No big mortgage company executive has had to face the law.

How about someone other than the Fabulous Fab [7] at Goldman Sachs? How could the Securities and Exchange Commission merely settle with Countrywide’s Angelo Mozilo [8] — and for a fraction of what he made as CEO?

The world was almost brought low by the American banking system and we are supposed to think that no one did anything wrong?

The most common explanation from lawyers for this bizarre state of affairs is that it’s hard work. It’s complicated to make criminal cases in corporate fraud. Getting a case that shows the wrong-doer acted with intent — and proving it to a jury — is difficult.

But, of course, Enron was complicated too, and prosecutors got the big boys. Ken Lay was found guilty (he died before he served his time). Jeff Skilling is in prison now, though the end result was bittersweet for prosecutors when much of his conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court. WorldCom’s Bernie Ebbers and Tyco’s Dennis Kozlowski are wearing stripes.

Complicated Cases

Sure, it takes time to investigate complicated cases. Many people think that the SEC, at the least, will bring some charges against top executives at Lehman Brothers. The huge, ground-breaking special examiner’s report [9] on Lehman Brothers laid bare problems with Lehman’s accounting. But that report came out back in March — on a bank that blew up more than two years ago. That seems awfully slow.

The most popular reason offered for the dearth of financial crisis prosecutions is the 100-year flood excuse: The banking system was hit by a systemic and unforeseeable disaster, which means that, as unpleasant as it may be to laymen, it’s unlikely that anyone committed any crimes.

Stupidity is No Crime

Or, barring that wildly implausible explanation (since, indeed, many people saw the crash coming and warned about it), the argument is that acting stupidly and recklessly is no crime.

As I ride the subway every morning, I often fantasize about criminalizing stupidity and fecklessness. But alas, it’s not to be.

Nevertheless, it’s hardly reassuring that bankers, out of necessity, have universally adopted the dumb-rather-than-venal justification. That doesn’t mean, however, that the rest of us need to buy it. It’s shocking how pervasive and triumphant this narrative of the financial crisis has been.

Link: http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/where-are-the-financial-crisis-prosecutions/

Assessment

Just as it’s clear that not all bankers were guilty of crimes in the lead-up to the crisis, it strains credulity to contend no one was. Corporate crime is usually the act of desperate people who have initially made relatively innocent mistakes and then seek to cover them up. Some banks went down innocently. Surely some housed bad actors who broke laws.

As a society, we have the bankers we deserve. Sadly, it’s looking like we have the regulators and prosecutors we deserve, too.

Conclusion

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

Product DetailsProduct DetailsProduct Details

Product Details  Product Details

How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the Bubble Going

Join Our Mailing List

On the Magnetar Trade

By Jesse Eisinger and Jake Bernstein, ProPublica – April 9, 2010 1:00 pm EDT

In late 2005, the booming U.S. housing market seemed to be slowing. The Federal Reserve had begun raising interest rates. Subprime mortgage company shares were falling. Investors began to balk at buying complex mortgage securities. The housing bubble, which had propelled a historic growth in home prices, seemed poised to deflate. And if it had, the great financial crisis of 2008, which produced the Great Recession of 2008-09, might have come sooner and been less severe.

Precise Timing

At just that moment, a few savvy financial engineers at a suburban Chicago hedge fund [1] helped revive the Wall Street money machine, spawning billions of dollars of securities ultimately backed by home mortgages.

Get ProPublica’s Top Stories and Major Investigations Delivered to Your Inbox

When the crash came, nearly all of these securities became worthless, a loss of an estimated $40 billion paid by investors, the investment banks who helped bring them into the world, and, eventually, American taxpayers.

Yet the hedge fund, named Magnetar for the super-magnetic field created by the last moments of a dying star, earned outsized returns in the year the financial crisis began.

The Magnetar Trade

How Magnetar pulled this off is one of the untold stories of the meltdown. Only a small group of Wall Street insiders was privy to what became known as the Magnetar Trade [2]. Nearly all of those approached by ProPublica declined to talk on the record, fearing their careers would be hurt if they spoke publicly. But interviews with participants, e-mails [3], thousands of pages of documents and details about the securities that until now have not been publicly disclosed shed light on an arcane, secretive corner of Wall Street.

According to bankers and others involved, the Magnetar Trade worked this way: The hedge fund bought the riskiest portion of a kind of securities known as collateralized debt obligations — CDOs. If housing prices kept rising, this would provide a solid return for many years. But that’s not what hedge funds are after. They want outsized gains, the sooner the better, and Magnetar set itself up for a huge win: It placed bets that portions of its own deals would fail.

Chance Enhancement

Along the way, it did something to enhance the chances of that happening, according to several people with direct knowledge of the deals. They say Magnetar pressed to include riskier assets in their CDOs that would make the investments more vulnerable to failure. The hedge fund acknowledges it bet against its own deals but says the majority of its short positions, as they are known on Wall Street, involved similar CDOs that it did not own. Magnetar says it never selected the assets that went into its CDOs.

Magnetar says it was “market neutral,” meaning it would make money whether housing rose or fell. (Read their full statement. [4]) Dozens of Wall Street professionals, including many who had direct dealings with Magnetar, are skeptical of that assertion. They understood the Magnetar Trade as a bet against the subprime mortgage securities market. Why else, they ask, would a hedge fund sponsor tens of billions of dollars of new CDOs at a time of rising uncertainty about housing?

Key details of the Magnetar Trade remain shrouded in secrecy and the fund declined to respond to most of our questions. Magnetar invested in 30 CDOs from the spring of 2006 to the summer of 2007, though it declined to name them. ProPublica has identified 26 [5].

Independent Analysis

An independent analysis [6] commissioned by ProPublica shows that these deals defaulted faster and at a higher rate compared to other similar CDOs. According to the analysis, 96 percent of the Magnetar deals were in default by the end of 2008, compared with 68 percent for comparable CDOs. The study [6] was conducted by PF2 Securities Evaluations, a CDO valuation firm. (Magnetar says defaults don’t necessarily indicate the quality of the underlying CDO assets.)

From what we’ve learned, there was nothing illegal in what Magnetar did; it was playing by the rules in place at the time. And the hedge fund didn’t cause the housing bubble or the financial crisis. But the Magnetar Trade does illustrate the perverse incentives and reckless behavior that characterized the last days of the boom.

Major Players

Magnetar worked with major banks, including Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and UBS. At least nine banks helped Magnetar hatch deals. Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and UBS all did multiple deals with Magnetar. JPMorgan Chase, often lauded for having avoided the worst of the CDO craze, actually ended up doing one of the riskiest deals with Magnetar, in May 2007, nearly a year after housing prices started to decline. According to marketing material and prospectuses [5], the banks didn’t disclose to CDO investors the role Magnetar played.

Many of the bankers who worked on these deals personally benefited, earning millions in annual bonuses. The banks booked profits at the outset. But those gains were fleeting. As it turned out, the banks that assembled and marketed the Magnetar CDOs had trouble selling them. And when the crash came, they were among the biggest losers.

Assessment

Of course, some bankers involved in the Magnetar Trade now regret what they did. We showed one of the many people fired as a result of the CDO collapse a list of unusually risky mortgage bonds included in a Magnetar deal he had worked on. The deal was a disaster. He shook his head at being reminded of the details and said: “After looking at this, I deserved to lose my job.”

Magnetar wasn’t the only market player to come up with clever ways to bet against housing. Many articles and books, including a bestseller by Michael Lewis [7], have recounted how a few investors saw trouble coming and bet big. Such short bets can be helpful; they can serve as a counterweight to manias and keep bubbles from expanding.

Magnetar’s approach had the opposite effect — by helping create investments it also bet against, the hedge fund was actually fueling the market. Magnetar wasn’t alone in that: A few other hedge funds also created CDOs they bet against. And, as the New York Times has reported, Goldman Sachs did too. But Magnetar industrialized the process, creating more and bigger CDOs.

Conclusion

Several journalists have alluded to the Magnetar Trade in recent years, but until now none has assembled a full narrative. Yves Smith, a prominent financial blogger who has reported on aspects of the Magnetar Trade, writes in her new book, “Econned,” [8] that “Magnetar went into the business of creating subprime CDOs on an unheard of scale. If the world had been spared their cunning, the insanity of 2006-2007 would have been less extreme and the unwinding milder.”

And so, your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Dr. Mike Burry, please opine. All feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, be sure to subscribe. It is fast, free and secure.

Link: http://feeds.feedburner.com/HealthcareFinancialsthePostForcxos

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

DICTIONARIES: http://www.springerpub.com/Search/marcinko
PHYSICIANS: www.MedicalBusinessAdvisors.com
PRACTICES: www.BusinessofMedicalPractice.com
HOSPITALS: http://www.crcpress.com/product/isbn/9781466558731
CLINICS: http://www.crcpress.com/product/isbn/9781439879900
BLOG: www.MedicalExecutivePost.com
FINANCE: Financial Planning for Physicians and Advisors
INSURANCE: Risk Management and Insurance Strategies for Physicians and Advisors

 

Product Details  Product Details

%d bloggers like this: