RELIGION STOCKS: Hidden Risks

By Vitaliy Katsenelson; CFA

***

***

The Hidden Risk in “Religion” Stocks
You can also listen to a professional narration of this article on iTunes & online.
ENCORE: March 22, 2004

A basic property of religion is that the believer takes a leap of faith: to believe without expecting proof. Often you find this property of religion in other, unexpected places – for example, in the stock market. It takes a while for a company to develop a “religious” following: only a few high-quality, well-respected companies with long track records ever become worshipped by millions of investors. My partner, Michael Conn, calls these “religion stocks.” The stock has to make a lot of shareholders happy for a long period of time to form this psychological link.

The stories (which are often true) of relatives or friends buying few hundred shares of the company and becoming millionaires have to fester a while for a stock to become a religion. Little by little, the past success of the company turns into an absolute – and eternal – truth. Investors’ belief becomes set: the past success paints a clear picture of the future.

Gradually, investors turn from cautious shareholders into loud cheerleaders. Management is praised as visionary. The stock becomes a one-decision stock: buy. This euphoria is not created overnight. It takes a long time to build it, and a lot of healthy pessimists have to become converted into believers before a stock becomes a “religion.” 

Once a stock is lifted up to “religion” status, beware: Logic is out the window. Analysts start using T-bills to discount the company’s cash flows in order to justify extraordinary valuations. Why, they ask, would you use any other discount rate if there is no risk? When a T-bill doesn’t do the trick, suddenly new and “more appropriate” valuation metrics are discovered.

Other investors don’t even try to justify the valuation – the stock did well for me in the past, why would it stop working in the future? Faith has taken over the stock. Fundamentals became a casualty of “stock religion.” These stocks are widely held. The common perception is that they are not risky. 

The general public loves these companies because they can relate to the companies’ brands. A dying husband would tell his wife, “Never sell _______ (fill in the blank with the company name).” Whenever a problem surfaces at a “religion stock,” it is brushed away with the comment that “it’s not like the company is going to go out of business.” True, a “religion stock” company is a solid leader in almost every market segment where it competes and the company’s products carry a strong brand name. However, one should always remember to distinguish between good companies and good stocks.

Coca-Cola is a classic example of a “religion stock.” There are very few companies that have delivered such consistent performance for so long and have such a strong international brand name as Coca-Cola. It is hard not to admire the company.

But admiration of Coca-Cola achieved an unbelievable level in the late nineties. In the ten years leading up to 1999, Coca-Cola grew earnings at 14.5% a year, very impressive for a 103-year-old company. It had very little debt, great cash flow and a top-tier management. This admiration came at a steep price: Coca-Cola commanded a P/E of 47.5. That P/E was 2.7 times the market P/E. Even after T-bills could no longer justify Coke’s valuation, analysts started to price “hidden” assets – Coke’s worldwide brand. No money manager ever got fired for owning Coca-Cola.

The company may not have had a lot of business risk. But in 1999, the high valuation was pricing in expectations that were impossible for any mature company to meet. “The future ain’t what it used to be” – Yogi Berra never lets us down. Success over a prolonged period of time brings a problem to any company – the law of large numbers. 

Enormous domestic and international market share, combined with maturity of the soft drink market, has made it very difficult for Coca-Cola to grow earnings and sales at rates comparable to the pre-1999 years. In the past five years, earnings and sales have grown 2.5% and 1.5% respectively. After Roberto C. Goizueta’s death, Coke struggled to find a good replacement – which it acutely needed.

Old age and arthritis eventually catch up with “religion stocks.” No company can grow at a fast pace forever. Growth in earnings and sales eventually decelerates. That leads to a gradual deflation of the “religion” premium. For Coke, the descent from its “religious” status resulted in a drop of nearly 20% in the share price – versus an increase of 65% in the broad market over the same time. And at current prices, the stock still is not cheap by any means. It trades at 25 times December 2004 earnings, despite expectations for sales growth in the mid single digits and EPS growth in the low double digits. 

It takes a while for the religion premium to be totally deflated because faith is a very strong emotion. A lot of frustration with sub-par performance has to come to the surface.

Disappointment chips away at faith one day at a time. “Religion” stocks are not safe stocks. The leap of faith and perception of safety come at a large cost: the hidden risk of reduction in the “religion premium.” The risk is hidden because it never showed itself in the past. “Religion” stocks by definition have had an incredibly consistent track record. Risk was rarely observed. 

However, this hidden risk is unique because it is not a question of if it will show up but a question of when. It is very hard to predict how far the premium will inflate before it deflates – but it will deflate eventually. When it does, the damage to the portfolio can be huge.

Religion stocks generally have a disproportionate weight in portfolios because they are never sold – exposing the trying-to-be-cautious investor to even greater risks. Coca-Cola is not alone in this exclusive club. General Electric, Gillette, Berkshire Hathaway are all proud members of the “religion stock” club as well. Past members would include: Polaroid – bankrupt; Eastman Kodak – in a major restructuring; AT&T – struggling to keep its head above water. That stock is down from over $80 in 1999 to $18 today.

Emotions have no place in investing. Faith, love, hate, and disgust should be left for other aspects of our life. More often than not, emotions guide us to do the opposite of what we need to do to be successful. Investors need to be agnostic towards “religion stocks.” The comfort and false sense of certainty that those stocks bring to the portfolio come at a huge cost: prolonged under performance.

My thoughts today (20+ years later)


This is one of the first investment articles I ever wrote. I had just started writing for TheStreet.com. It’s interesting to read this article more than 20 years later. I am surprised my writing was not as bad as I had feared (though in many cases it was worse than I feared when I read my other early articles).

So much has happened since then – I am a different person today than I was back then. I have two more kids; I have written three more books and a thousand articles. The last two decades were my formative years as an investor and adult.

The goal of the article was not to make predictions but to warn readers that the long-term success of certain companies creates a cult-like following and deforms thinking. In fact, my original article – the one I submitted to TheStreet.com – did not mention any companies other than Coke. The editors wanted me to include more names so that the article would show up on more pages of Yahoo! Finance.

With the exception of Berkshire Hathaway, all of these companies have produced mediocre or horrible returns. In the best case, their fundamental returns in their old age were only a fraction of what they were when these companies were younger and the world was their oyster.

To my surprise, Coke’s stock is still trading at a high valuation. Its business has performed like the old-timer it is, with revenue and earnings growing by only 3–4% a year. The days of double-digit revenue and earnings growth were left in the 80s and 90s, though the high valuation remained. 

COMMENTS APPRECIATED

Refer, Like and Subscribe

***

***

TELECOMMUNICATIONS: The Infinite Game

By Vitaliy Katsenelson, CFA

***

CABLE COMPANIES
CHTR, just like Comcast, showed only a very slight decline in broadband customers in the last quarter. Most of the decline came from the US government removing subsidies for rural customers. Overall, the business is doing very well.

I want to remind you that broadband is not a secularly challenged business, but an advantaged business that we believe will resume growth soon. 

Cable companies continue to offer a great product on the market, which is actually improving in quality as I type this because they are upgrading their networks to be as fast as fiber. They should be done with their full network upgrade in a year or so.

Also, cable companies have shown that they are very good at attracting wireless customers from wireless carriers. (They have grown their wireless business by 25% in 2024). The more we analyzed this industry. the more bearish we became on AT&T and Verizon.

Though owning cable stocks has not been rewarding (I’m being very gentle to myself), the more research we’ve done into the industry, the more convinced we’ve become that once the dust settles, their market share will not decrease but likely increase. Fixed wireless has taken all the share it will take and will start donating share to cable companies as customers get frustrated with intermittency of the service and usage caps. 

The industry is moving towards the bundle – one bill for broadband and wireless (and maybe TV service, though that has been marginalized by streamers). It’s a lot easier for cable companies to add wireless customers than for wireless companies to add wired broadband customers. 

This point is paramount! 

It costs very little for a cable company to add a wireless subscriber, as 80-90% of a subscriber’s data is traveling on Wi-Fi (i.e., the cable network is already there). 

Meanwhile, the cost of building out broadband is pushing into uneconomical territory, for several reasons. First of all, all the low-hanging fruit has already been picked. It costs, let’s say, $50-100 thousand dollars to lay a mile of fiber, whether that covers one or a thousand homes. High-density areas already have cable or fiber service. With the latest upgrades the cable industry is doing, both their upload and download speeds are on par with fiber. Second, labor costs have gone up significantly over the last few years.

Verizon just announced buying Frontier Communications for $20 billion. Frontier has 2.2 million fiber subscribers. With this purchase, Verizon is paying $9,000 per fiber subscriber.

Let’s examine the economics of this transaction:

Frontier gets about $800 a year of revenues from these broadband customers (on a par with Charter and Comcast). Let’s say they achieve a 23% margin (Frontier is barely a profitable business, so I’m using Charter’s margins). Thus, each customer will generate $184 of profit for them. So Verizon is paying $9,000 for $184 of profit, and it will take Verizon 49 years to break even on this transaction. 

As you can see, these economics make no sense. Verizon and AT&T are horrible at capital allocation, and this deal is a sign of supreme desperation. The market has been slow to see what we see in Charter and Comcast, and this is always our goal – we want the market to agree with us, later. 

Our very conservative estimate of Charter’s 2028 free cash flow per share is $48-60. In this estimate we are assuming no customer growth in broadband and 2% price increases a year. At 13-15 times free cash flows, we get a price of around $630-900 in 2028. Charter is trading at about $320 as I write this. 

We really like Charter’s management. We heard an anecdote about Charter CEO Chris Winfrey that warmed our soul. A week after he became CEO, Charter announced a huge, multibillion-dollar upgrade for its broadband network. This news sent the stock down 15%. (I wrote about it; we thought it was a great idea.) Anyway, someone met Chris at a party and told him, “That’s the right move, but very gutsy.” Chris said, “We build the company for our grandchildren.” This is what we want to see from our CEOs. They’re willing to sacrifice short-term profitability to improve the business’s moat.

Often, the idea of “creating shareholder value” is misunderstood. Paying employees poorly, abusing suppliers, and trying to rip off your customers is not going to create long-term (key term) shareholder value. It may bring short-term profits and boost the stock price, but it shortens the company’s growth runway and erodes its moat.

I don’t want to get off topic, but I’ve been thinking a lot about this. We’ve spent a lot of time studying the aircraft industry; our focus was Airbus, and thus we spent a lot of time looking at Boeing.

Boeing, under previous management, focused on “shareholder value creation.” It cut costs, laid off a lot of workers, including many quality control folks. Its “shareholder value creation” didn’t stop there; it willingly lied to regulators and took shortcuts in safety. Specifically, Boeing made critical design changes to its 737 MAX aircraft without fully informing regulators or pilots, and pushed for reduced pilot training requirements to save costs. These decisions directly contributed to two fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019, resulting in 346 deaths and the worldwide grounding of the 737 MAX for nearly two years.

Did its management actions maximize shareholder value? Well, it depends on the time frame. It boosted short-term earnings and drove the stock price higher. It may have made its CEO rich beyond belief.

But.

Over a longer time frame, these decisions have destroyed shareholder value. People used to say, “If it’s not Boeing, I’m not going.” Today, I become slightly more religious when I board a Boeing plane. The company has incurred over $20 billion in direct costs related to the 737 MAX crisis, including compensation to airlines and families of crash victims, and increased production costs. 

This doesn’t account for the incalculable damage to Boeing’s reputation and loss of market share. It gave Airbus an opening to produce more planes and take market share, with Airbus surpassing Boeing in deliveries and orders in recent years, particularly in the crucial narrow-body market.

We want to own companies that aim to maximize long-term shareholder value by treating all their stakeholders fairly. We want our companies to play the infinite game. What does “fairly” mean in this context? I’ll borrow from US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, who famously dodged defining pornography by saying, “I know it when I see it.”

Update: After I wrote the above, Charter proposed to buy Liberty through a merger. We don’t own Charter directly, but rather through Liberty Broadband, which holds a 25% stake in Charter. Liberty was trading at a significant discount (around 30%) to the value of its Charter shares. Liberty agreed, but at a higher price. Our estimate of Liberty’s net asset value is about $88. The shares are trading at $75 as of this writing (up from $60). If the deal goes through we’ll end up owning shares of Charter at a significant discount.

COMMENTS APPRECIATED

Thank You

***

***

Mobile Health Solutions Video from AT&T

Join Our Mailing List

From HIMSS 2012 and Physician Nexus

 

Video Link :http://physiciannexus.com/video/mobile-health-solutions-from-at-t

Conclusion

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Link: http://feeds.feedburner.com/HealthcareFinancialsthePostForcxos

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

Our Other Print Books and Related Information Sources:

Health Dictionary Series: http://www.springerpub.com/Search/marcinko

Practice Management: http://www.springerpub.com/product/9780826105752

Physician Financial Planning: http://www.jbpub.com/catalog/0763745790

Medical Risk Management: http://www.jbpub.com/catalog/9780763733421

Hospitals: http://www.crcpress.com/product/isbn/9781439879900

Physician Advisors: www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.org

Product DetailsProduct DetailsProduct Details

Product Details  Product Details

Product Details