MUSINGS: A Famous Portfolio Asset Allocation Study

Some Critics Claim Brinson, Hood, and Beebower Conclusions Wrong

By Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA MEd CMP

http://www.MarcinkoAssociates.com

http://www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.org

Frequently, we hear the axiom that asset allocation is the most important investment decision, explaining 93.6% of portfolio returns. The presumption has been that once the risk tolerance and time horizon have been established, investing is simply a matter of implementing a fixed mix of stocks, bonds, and cash using mutual funds selected for this purpose. This axiom is based on a famous study by Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (BHB) published in the Financial Analysts Journal in July/August 1986. It is the stuff of most modern business school and graduate students in economics and finance.

Enter the Critics

One critic claims that BHB’s conclusions and the interpretation of their conclusions are wrong, stating that because of several methodological problems, BHB needed to make certain assumptions for their analysis to go forward. They assumed that the average asset-class weights for the 10-year period studied are the same as the actual normal policy weights; that investments in foreign stocks, real estate, private placements, and venture capital can be proxied by a mix of stocks, bonds, and cash; and that the benchmarks for stocks, bonds, and cash against which fund performance was measured are appropriate. The author believes that each of these assumptions can lead to a faulty measurement of success or failure at market timing and stock selection.

The Jahnke Study

William Jahnke claims that BHB erred in their focus on explaining the variation of quarterly portfolio returns rather than portfolio returns over the 10-year period studied. According to the study, asset allocation policy explains only a small fraction of the range of 10-year portfolio returns earned by the pension funds reported in the study. The author concluded that this discrepancy is caused by the effect of compounding returns. He adds that BHB were wrong to use variance of quarterly returns rather than the standard deviation. Use of standard deviation would reduce the often cited 93.6% to about 79%. Moreover, BHB did not consider the cost of investing, such as operating expenses, management fees, brokerage commissions, and other trading costs, which are more significant for individual investors than for the pension plans studied. Jahnke claims that excessive costs can reduce wealth accumulation by 50%.

Note: (“The Asset Allocation Hoax,” William W. Jahnke, Journal of Financial Planning, February 1997, Institute of Certified Financial Planners [303] 759-4900).

Assessment

Finally, the author takes issue with establishing long-term fixed asset class weights. Asset allocation should be a dynamic process. Higher equity return expectations should in turn produce larger equity allocations, other things being equal.

Conclusion

Are doctors different than the average investor noted in this essay?

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

Product Details

  Risk Management, Liability Insurance, and Asset Protection Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™8Comprehensive Financial Planning Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™

Invite Dr. Marcinko

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Musings on a Famous Portfolio Asset Allocation Study

Some Critics Claim Brinson, Hood, and Beebower Conclusions Wrong

[By Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA CMP™]

http://www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.org

[Publisher-in-Chief]

Frequently, we hear the axiom that asset allocation is the most important investment decision, explaining 93.6% of portfolio returns. The presumption has been that once the risk tolerance and time horizon have been established, investing is simply a matter of implementing a fixed mix of stocks, bonds, and cash using mutual funds selected for this purpose. This axiom is based on a famous study by Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (BHB) published in the Financial Analysts Journal in July/August 1986. It is the stuff of most modern business school and graduate students in economics and finance.

Enter the Critics

One critic claims that BHB’s conclusions and the interpretation of their conclusions are wrong, stating that because of several methodological problems, BHB needed to make certain assumptions for their analysis to go forward. They assumed that the average asset-class weights for the 10-year period studied are the same as the actual normal policy weights; that investments in foreign stocks, real estate, private placements, and venture capital can be proxied by a mix of stocks, bonds, and cash; and that the benchmarks for stocks, bonds, and cash against which fund performance was measured are appropriate. The author believes that each of these assumptions can lead to a faulty measurement of success or failure at market timing and stock selection.

The Jahnke Study

William Jahnke claims that BHB erred in their focus on explaining the variation of quarterly portfolio returns rather than portfolio returns over the 10-year period studied. According to the study, asset allocation policy explains only a small fraction of the range of 10-year portfolio returns earned by the pension funds reported in the study. The author concluded that this discrepancy is caused by the effect of compounding returns. He adds that BHB were wrong to use variance of quarterly returns rather than the standard deviation. Use of standard deviation would reduce the often cited 93.6% to about 79%. Moreover, BHB did not consider the cost of investing, such as operating expenses, management fees, brokerage commissions, and other trading costs, which are more significant for individual investors than for the pension plans studied. Jahnke claims that excessive costs can reduce wealth accumulation by 50%.

Note: (“The Asset Allocation Hoax,” William W. Jahnke, Journal of Financial Planning, February 1997, Institute of Certified Financial Planners [303] 759-4900).

Assessment

Finally, the author takes issue with establishing long-term fixed asset class weights. Asset allocation should be a dynamic process. Higher equity return expectations should in turn produce larger equity allocations, other things being equal.

Certified Medical Planner

Conclusion

Are doctors different than the average investor noted in this essay?

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Link: http://feeds.feedburner.com/HealthcareFinancialsthePostForcxos

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

Product Details

  Risk Management, Liability Insurance, and Asset Protection Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™8Comprehensive Financial Planning Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™

Invite Dr. Marcinko

***

Musings on a Famous Portfolio Asset Allocation Study

Some Critics Claim Brinson, Hood, and Beebower Conclusions Wrong

[By Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA CMP™]

http://www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.org

[Publisher-in-Chief]

Frequently, we hear the axiom that asset allocation is the most important investment decision, explaining 93.6% of portfolio returns. The presumption has been that once the risk tolerance and time horizon have been established, investing is simply a matter of implementing a fixed mix of stocks, bonds, and cash using mutual funds selected for this purpose. This axiom is based on a famous study by Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (BHB) published in the Financial Analysts Journal in July/August 1986. It is the stuff of most modern business school and graduate students in economics and finance.

Enter the Critics

One critic claims that BHB’s conclusions and the interpretation of their conclusions are wrong, stating that because of several methodological problems, BHB needed to make certain assumptions for their analysis to go forward. They assumed that the average asset-class weights for the 10-year period studied are the same as the actual normal policy weights; that investments in foreign stocks, real estate, private placements, and venture capital can be proxied by a mix of stocks, bonds, and cash; and that the benchmarks for stocks, bonds, and cash against which fund performance was measured are appropriate. The author believes that each of these assumptions can lead to a faulty measurement of success or failure at market timing and stock selection.

The Jahnke Study

William Jahnke claims that BHB erred in their focus on explaining the variation of quarterly portfolio returns rather than portfolio returns over the 10-year period studied. According to the study, asset allocation policy explains only a small fraction of the range of 10-year portfolio returns earned by the pension funds reported in the study. The author concluded that this discrepancy is caused by the effect of compounding returns. He adds that BHB were wrong to use variance of quarterly returns rather than the standard deviation. Use of standard deviation would reduce the often cited 93.6% to about 79%. Moreover, BHB did not consider the cost of investing, such as operating expenses, management fees, brokerage commissions, and other trading costs, which are more significant for individual investors than for the pension plans studied. Jahnke claims that excessive costs can reduce wealth accumulation by 50%.

Note: (“The Asset Allocation Hoax,” William W. Jahnke, Journal of Financial Planning, February 1997, Institute of Certified Financial Planners [303] 759-4900).

Assessment

Finally, the author takes issue with establishing long-term fixed asset class weights. Asset allocation should be a dynamic process. Higher equity return expectations should in turn produce larger equity allocations, other things being equal.

Certified Medical Planner

Conclusion

Are doctors different than the average investor noted in this essay?

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Link: http://feeds.feedburner.com/HealthcareFinancialsthePostForcxos

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

Product Details

  Risk Management, Liability Insurance, and Asset Protection Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™8Comprehensive Financial Planning Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™

Invite Dr. Marcinko

***

Musings on a Famous Portfolio Asset Allocation Study

Some Critics Claim Brinson, Hood, and Beebower Conclusions Wrong

[By Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA CMP™]

http://www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.org

[Publisher-in-Chief]

Frequently, we hear the axiom that asset allocation is the most important investment decision, explaining 93.6% of portfolio returns. The presumption has been that once the risk tolerance and time horizon have been established, investing is simply a matter of implementing a fixed mix of stocks, bonds, and cash using mutual funds selected for this purpose. This axiom is based on a famous study by Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (BHB) published in the Financial Analysts Journal in July/August 1986. It is the stuff of most modern business school and graduate students in economics and finance.

Enter the Critics

One critic claims that BHB’s conclusions and the interpretation of their conclusions are wrong, stating that because of several methodological problems, BHB needed to make certain assumptions for their analysis to go forward. They assumed that the average asset-class weights for the 10-year period studied are the same as the actual normal policy weights; that investments in foreign stocks, real estate, private placements, and venture capital can be proxied by a mix of stocks, bonds, and cash; and that the benchmarks for stocks, bonds, and cash against which fund performance was measured are appropriate. The author believes that each of these assumptions can lead to a faulty measurement of success or failure at market timing and stock selection.

The Jahnke Study

William Jahnke claims that BHB erred in their focus on explaining the variation of quarterly portfolio returns rather than portfolio returns over the 10-year period studied. According to the study, asset allocation policy explains only a small fraction of the range of 10-year portfolio returns earned by the pension funds reported in the study. The author concluded that this discrepancy is caused by the effect of compounding returns. He adds that BHB were wrong to use variance of quarterly returns rather than the standard deviation. Use of standard deviation would reduce the often cited 93.6% to about 79%. Moreover, BHB did not consider the cost of investing, such as operating expenses, management fees, brokerage commissions, and other trading costs, which are more significant for individual investors than for the pension plans studied. Jahnke claims that excessive costs can reduce wealth accumulation by 50%.

Note: (“The Asset Allocation Hoax,” William W. Jahnke, Journal of Financial Planning, February 1997, Institute of Certified Financial Planners [303] 759-4900).

Assessment

Finally, the author takes issue with establishing long-term fixed asset class weights. Asset allocation should be a dynamic process. Higher equity return expectations should in turn produce larger equity allocations, other things being equal.

Certified Medical Planner

Conclusion

Are doctors different than the average investor noted in this essay?

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Link: http://feeds.feedburner.com/HealthcareFinancialsthePostForcxos

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

OUR OTHER PRINT BOOKS AND RELATED INFORMATION SOURCES:

Product Details

  Risk Management, Liability Insurance, and Asset Protection Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™8Comprehensive Financial Planning Strategies for Doctors and Advisors: Best Practices from Leading Consultants and Certified Medical Planners™

Invite Dr. Marcinko

***

Do Physician Investors and/or their Financial Advisors Use and Abuse Modern Portfolio Theory?

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The Cultural Clash of Passivity versus Activity

By Dr. David Edward Marcinko MBA CMP™

www.CertifiedMedicalPlanner.org

[Publisher-in-Chief]

Ninety-three year old Professor Harry Markowitz PhD, coined the phrase “modern portfolio theory” [MPT] and concluded that investors are rewarded for taking certain risks but may not get rewarded for taking others. He developed the notion of an “efficient frontier” for different groups of asset classes and the idea that the higher the expected return, the higher the risk.

The Brinson, Hood, Beebower Study

In their 1986 study, Brinson, Hood, and Beebower attempted to measure three investment activities: (1) asset class selection, (2) market timing, and (3) security selection. They concluded that asset class selection had, by far, the greatest effect on the risk/return characteristics of a portfolio (some 93.6% of performance). But the most startling conclusion was that, if left alone, investment policy would have produced a higher average return than when market timing and security selection were taken into account. These latter factors actually reduced the average return over a 10-year period.

The Fama & French Study

In 1982, Fama and French found that three factors—market exposure, company size, and “value”—were systematic risks that explained the vast majority of equity market returns. “U.S. small-cap value stocks” is therefore a discreet asset class possessing all three of these systematic risks.

Most physicians and financial advisors are aware of modern portfolio theory but some fail to apply the principles to actual investor situations. Three examples: (1) using erroneous asset-class definitions, (2) using actively managed funds, and (3) relying on market timing. The abuse of modern portfolio theory can create portfolios loaded with latent risks that, on the surface, appear benign.

Not all Agree

Not everyone is in agreement with modern portfolio theory. Some detractors agree in principle, recognizing, for example, that “value” stocks have had higher returns than “growth” issues but they cite the cause as “mispricing” rather than risk.

Assessment

Institutional investors have gradually increased their commitment to passive strategies from virtually zero 20 years ago to 30% or more in the last decade [Think: Vanguard].

Individual and physician investors, on the other hand, have less than a 5% commitment.

Note: “Modern Portfolio Theory: Fact or Fiction?,” Gerard F. Stellwagen and Robin P. LaCouture, NAPFA Advisor, July 1997, pp. 1–7, National Association of Personal Financial Advisors for Fee-Only Financial Advisors.

Conclusion

Your thoughts and comments on this ME-P are appreciated. Feel free to review our top-left column, and top-right sidebar materials, links, URLs and related websites, too. Then, subscribe to the ME-P. It is fast, free and secure.

Link: http://feeds.feedburner.com/HealthcareFinancialsthePostForcxos

Speaker: If you need a moderator or speaker for an upcoming event, Dr. David E. Marcinko; MBA – Publisher-in-Chief of the Medical Executive-Post – is available for seminar or speaking engagements. Contact: MarcinkoAdvisors@msn.com

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